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This thesis proposes the study of rumor as a guide to the battle for hearts and 
minds in Iraq.  It reviews existing rumor theory to identify how rumors function and what 
we can learn from them.  Rumors often serve as a window into a community, and can 
provide valuable information for developing a campaign to assess, monitor, and gain the 
support necessary to defeat insurgents.  This thesis employs two distinct typologies to 
analyze over ten months of rumors in Baghdad, Iraq.  The motivation typology provides 
indications of Iraqi sentiment, and suggests unrelieved anxiety and fear is likely 
contributing to widespread hostility towards the US-led Coalition.  Indications of 
unrealistic expectations are also evident, potentially contributing to hostility levels as 
they go unrealized.  The subject typology identifies overarching concerns of the Iraqi 
people, and suggests there are specific fears inhibiting cooperation with US 
counterinsurgency efforts.  This thesis then examines rumor remedies.  Because they rely 
on effective communication skills, American and Arab cultural communication styles are 
contrasted and integrated into tailored remedies for Iraq.  The findings in this thesis could 
assist Coalition information campaigns by alerting them to existing Iraqi perceptions so 
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It is time to start winning wars vice battles - winning hearts and minds 
vice temporary respite.  With that we will win the peace. 
- Dave Dilegge, Urban Operations Journal 
A successful insurgency, as we have seen in Iraq, requires the active support of a 
comparative few, and acquiescence from the rest of the population.  Decades of Saddam 
Hussein’s brutal rule have taught Iraqis that the best way to survive is not to take sides.  
The majority of Iraqis resent the occupation by the United States and its partners, making 
them even less likely to actively oppose the insurgents and cooperate with Coalition 
forces.  (Metz 2004)  Yet counterinsurgency strategy seeks to achieve exactly that—
“winning the hearts and minds” of a population.1  It does not require the Iraqi people to 
‘like’ Americans, rather that they recognize the advantages of cooperating with the 
Coalition and against the resistance.  Our current efforts to win Iraqi hearts and minds 
appear at best to be uncoordinated and haphazard, and at worst counterproductive.  Many 
Iraqis perceive the Americans as using excessive force and see the occupation as little 
improvement over a dictatorship, as described by Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, deputy chief of 
one of the largest Sunni tribes in Iraq and member of the American-appointed Governing 
Council: 
The United States is using excessive power.  They round up people in a 
very humiliating way, by putting bags over their faces in front of their 
families.  In our society, this is like rape.  The Americans are using 
collective punishment by jailing relatives.  What is the difference from 
Saddam?  They are demolishing houses now.  They say they want to teach 
a lesson to the people.  But when Timothy McVeigh was convicted in the 
bombing in Oklahoma City, was his family's home destroyed?  You 
cannot win the hearts and minds of the people by using force.  What's the 
difference between dictatorship and what's happening now?  (Maass 2004) 
It is vital to understand Iraqi perceptions, as perception is key to efforts to win 
hearts and minds.  If US perceptions of the problems and attitudes of a local population 
are incorrect, then any solutions devised to fix those problems would also be incorrect.  
                                                 
1 The British first coined this term after World War II to describe efforts to put down insurgents in 
their former colonies, but the concept has been around much longer.   (Hayden 2003) 
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Conversely, regardless of the sincerity of intent or expended effort, if our actions are 
perceived to be adverse to the beliefs, needs, interest, or desires of the local populace, 
they will not lend their support.  Despite the recognition that winning hearts and minds is 
a critical aspect of a successful counterinsurgency, many military planners approach it as 
an afterthought, if at all.  This is likely due, at least in part, to the inherent difficulties in 
determining what the primary concerns and fears are that prevent a populace from 
cooperating against insurgents, accurately assessing their perceptions of our efforts to 
reduce those concerns, and the further complication of measuring our own effectiveness.  
We learned the hard lesson in Vietnam that hearts and minds won cannot be measured by 
counting tons of bombs dropped or the number of enemy killed.  Although similar 
methods are still attempted, such as counting the megawatts of power produced in Iraq, 
the US has also turned to public opinion polls to gauge our progress, but these are 
expensive, difficult measurements to make with their own built-in biases and limitations.2 
This thesis proposes an alternative way to guide and measure effectiveness of the 
battle for hearts and minds: the study of rumor.  It is often rumor that attributes incorrect 
causes and motivations, fuels misperceptions, and escalates conflicts.  By tapping into the 
abundant reservoir of circulating rumors in Iraq, we can determine the underlying fears, 
anxieties, and sentiment of the people and use that information to develop a more 
successful campaign to assess, monitor, and win their support.  A key mechanism for 
looking into the hearts and minds of Iraqis was developed by Bill Putnam, chief of The 
Baghdad Mosquito, an open source intelligence (OSINT) report produced by the MNF-
I/III Corps Analysis and Control Element (ACE).  In addition to providing a daily 
summary of local and regional media stories, the small staff of American intelligence 
analysts, linguists and Iraqis meet to identify and discuss the latest circulating rumors and 
publish them in the weekly feature, “What’s the Word on the Streets of Baghdad?”  This 
data is distributed to US personnel in Iraq as well as officials in Washington, DC.  
Although the rumor mill has become a “cult favorite,” there are no known 
institutionalized efforts to process it in a way to meaningfully aid counterinsurgency 
                                                 
2 There have only been four major scientific polls conducted in Iraq/Baghdad between Aug 03 and Jun 
04 by Zogby, ABC, and Gallup.  Each poll had a slightly different focus, and variations in how similar 
questions and answers were phrased makes it difficult to conduct long term trend analysis of Iraqi public 
opinion.   
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strategy.3  Putnam and his staff have taken an important first step in tracking rumors in 
Baghdad and providing a window into what the average Iraqi opinion is and why they 
think and accept the things they do.  Although public affairs, information operations and 
psychological operations all require this insight in order to be truly effective in 
disseminating US intentions and shaping the Iraqi perspective, there is no central, 
hierarchical mechanism to tie these efforts together.  Furthermore, aside from 
institutional knowledge that is regularly rotated out of theater, there is no repository for 
identifying and analyzing trends in rumor activity.  There are occasional ad hoc efforts 
toward countering specific rumors, primarily if commanders feel operational 
repercussions such as rioting may result, but most day-to-day rumors are often laughed at 
and dismissed as entertainment.4  Are rumors just the silly musings of unsophisticated 
Iraqis, or do they have widespread influence over perceptions and actions?  What can we 
learn from rumors and why are they so pervasive in the Middle East?  Can the US fuse 
the insights gained from rumor into more effective communication strategies aimed at 
winning hearts and minds, and if so, how?  Finally, is it even possible or worthwhile to 
combat rumors, or must we accept their prevalence as a fact of life in Iraq? 
This thesis develops a typology of rumor and prescriptions of possible remedy.  
The thesis argues that although the function and transmission of rumor operates similarly 
across cultures, the communication mechanisms to counter rumor must be tailored to the 
particular cultural context in which they operate.  In other words, although the 
psychology of rumor is more or less universal, the information or psychological 
operations remedy is not.  
A. WHAT IS RUMOR? 
Rumors are unconfirmed news in widespread circulation.  They differ from 
gossip—typically idle talk that occurs only to entertain or establish social mores—in that 
rumors have an element of urgency to them.  (Rosnow 1988)  They arise and spread 
when people are uncertain and anxious about a subject they deem important, and the 
rumor appears to offer a viable explanation.  (Bordia and DiFonzo n.d.)  When desired 
                                                 
3 Putnam, Bill.  E-mail to the author.  20 Aug 2004. 
4 Lang, LTC John., USMC and CPT Shannon Greene, USMC, I MEF, G2.  Personal interview, 19 
Aug 2004. 
4 
information is withheld, unavailable or distrusted, rumors are likely to increase, for 
rumors help people make sense of the world. 
Rumors—also known in the Middle East as whispering campaigns and the “souk-
telegraph”—are often “as effective as radio broadcasts” in spreading their message.  
(Sharabi 1966)  They are typically spread by word of mouth, but as technology advances 
so does the ability to transmit rumors.  Today, rumors are found not only on the street, 
but also on the Internet, in newspapers, and on the radio and TV.  While many news 
outlets try to maintain high standards of journalistic integrity and actively avoid 
promulgating rumors, the occasional unverified story slips by.  Some news agencies, 
particularly in the Middle East, have little experience and training in Western ideals of 
independent journalism and have been slow to implement the associated strict reporting 
standards, resulting in frequent coverage of rumors.  While transmission by these sources 
can certainly lend credibility to rumors, they would undoubtedly continue to flourish 
without any assistance until the underlying conditions that prompted the rumors improve.  
Those conditions can vary, but rumors thrive in times of uncertainty or social distress, 
like during war or natural disasters, or when access to credible information is lacking, 
such as in the predominantly state-controlled atmosphere of the Middle East. 
B. WHY IS RUMOR SIGNIFICANT? 
Rumors should not be dismissed as simply idle or malicious talk—they are a 
valuable tool that sheds light on the mind-set of a community.  Rumors can alert officials 
to potential violence or conflict, provide a mechanism for measuring public opinion, and 
even expose enemy propaganda efforts.   
Rumor and conflict go hand in hand—much of history can be regarded as the 
reactions of people to rumor.  (Allport and Postman 1947a)  Throughout the Middle 
Ages, for example, rumors of miracles, divine commands, and immense treasure spurred 
the crusades and other religious wars.  While wars are certainly an extreme example, 
rumors can lead to violence at all levels.  By examining transmission, or who is talking to 
whom, rumors can provide insight into the structure of the community and tap into the 
pulse of different groups, alerting officials to growing cleavages or possible inter-group 
violence in local communities.  In November 2003, for instance, rumors spread that 
Hindu militants had killed a Muslim builder in Ahmedabad, India, the sight of deadly 
5 
religious riots the year before.  Violent clashes soon followed, resulting in nine deaths, 
including an attack on a motorcyclist who was set on fire along with his vehicle.  It 
turned out the builder had been killed, but by a member of his own Muslim community.5   
Rumors almost always precede riots and other acts of group aggression, providing 
a window of opportunity for officials to thwart it or at least prepare a response.  In early 
October 2003, rumors that stipend pay for former Iraqi soldiers would be cut off resulted 
in rioting in both Baghdad and Basra, leaving two Iraqis dead, dozens injured, and 
several businesses burned down.6  On a much larger scale, in 1979, a rumor spread 
through the markets in the old Pakistani city of Rawalpindi that Americans or Israelis had 
seized the Kaaba in Mecca, the central shrine of Islam.  The rumor ignited emotions that 
were already high due to the assault on the US Embassy in Iran three weeks earlier.  Tens 
of thousands of Pakistanis rushed to the US compound in the nearby capital of Islamabad, 
destroyed the wall outside the embassy brick by brick, and ransacked the offices.  Four 
people were killed, including a Marine guard, before the protesters were subdued by 
Pakistani army troops.7 
Rumors also provide a means for measuring public opinion—a task central to 
winning hearts and minds.  Public opinion is the temporary and fluctuating attitudes and 
beliefs that result from collective efforts to interpret constantly emerging situations.  
(Peterson and Gist 1951)  Using rumors to gauge and influence the mood on the street is 
an ancient practice.  Rome appointed public rumor wardens, called delatores, who 
mingled with the population and reported what they heard to the palace.  The Romans 
considered this a good barometer of public sentiment and often used the delatores to 
launch their own counteroffensive rumors.   (Allport and Postman 1947a)  Most 
infamously, when half of Rome was burned in a fire in 64 C.E., Emperor Nero instigated 
a rumor claiming the Christians had started it in order to divert unfavorable attention 
away from himself, resulting in the first persecution of the Christians.  (Columbia 
Encyclopedia, 6th ed., s.v. “Nero”)  There are even some hints that after World War II, 
                                                 
5 “Eight shot dead, one burned to death in clashes in India,” Manila Times, 11 Nov 2003. 
6 Associated Press, “Stone throwing Ex-Soldiers Confront Troops,” Houston Chronicle, 4 Oct 2003. 
7 Rone Tempest and Tyler Marshall, “Pakistan’s Riot History Gives the U.S. Pause,” Los Angeles 
Times, 10 Oct 2001. 
6 
despite the Soviet government’s monopoly on information in the USSR, it occasionally 
planted rumors it wanted circulated and used them as one of its few resources for 
sounding public opinion.  (Bauer and Gleicher 1953) 
Assessing foreign public opinion, especially in the culturally distinct Middle East, 
is a relatively sporadic and difficult task for Westerners.  Most efforts rely on polls, 
which can provide objective measurements if representative samples are selected and 
culture is considered when wording and conducting the polls, but they often only offer a 
snapshot of current sentiment.  Rumors, on the other hand, both express and form public 
opinion.  They are unlikely to take hold unless they are perceived as plausible, and the 
more a specific rumor is heard the more currency it gains, shifting the orientation of 
public thinking and ultimately steering opinion.  For example, in Iraq there is a 
recognized ‘Circle of Information’ in which people hear rumors, which they pass on to 
their friends and family, who tell their friends and family and so on until the story returns 
to the original source.  Slight differences in the returning rumors lead them to believe it is 
a different story, validating and reinforcing their original thoughts and feelings.  
(Baghdad Mosquito 2004) 
Furthermore, while pollsters predetermine issues to discuss, rumors reflect 
opinion spontaneously, arising naturally out of the publics’ interests.  They also bypass 
resistances and defenses that may inhibit people from answering polls honestly.  
Individuals answering polls may feel internal pressure to answer questions in a certain 
way, possibly due to national, ethnic or religious loyalties or fear, which may skew the 
results.  Immediately after 9/11, for example, few Americans would make unfavorable 
comments about President Bush, earning him an extraordinary 88% approval rating—his 
highest ever.  This was up from just 52% the month before, a rating he slowly, but 
consistently returned to by February 2003.  (Harris Poll 2003)  Ultimately, rumors can 
offer a glimpse of the deeper structure of public opinion—the rationalizations and 
projections upon which opinion is based—not just the end results seen in polls.  (Knapp 
1944) 
Finally, rumor is an ideal tool of the propagandist to influence morale, especially 
in times of war or conflict.  For example, on 28 June 2004, the Editor-in-Chief of the 
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Iraqi newspaper Addustour reported, “The antagonists in Iraq are trying to use rumors to 
undermine the relationship between the Iraqi people and the new government.”8  Rumor 
not only offers wide and rapid dissemination, but it also disguises its source, enabling it 
to influence relationships or fuel doubts while bypassing the inherent skepticism that 
accompanies messages from the ‘enemy’—a feat most standard psychological operations 
or propaganda attempts are unable to accomplish.  “If leaflets, newspapers, or radio 
broadcasts are likened to bullets, then rumor must be likened to a torpedo; for once 
launched, it travels of its own power.”  (Knapp 1944, 28)  The US government 
recognized the destructiveness of stateside rumors during World War II, and actively 
sought to monitor and control them.  They established the Office of Facts and Figures, 
the Office of War Information, and even devoted portions of Presidential radio addresses 
to issue information and produce publications as ‘antidotes’ to rumor.  These offices 
conducted undercover investigations to pursue sources of particularly malicious rumors.  
Private rumor clinics, often consisting of recurring magazine or newspaper articles, were 
also implemented to refute rumors.  (Allport and Postman 1947a)  Whether planted or 
naturally occurring, keeping tabs on circulating rumors is imperative if propaganda 
operations are to be detected and effective counteractions initiated. 
Overall, there are numerous ways rumor serves as a window into the inner 
workings and perceptions a community.  Even Saddam Hussein recognized the power 
and value of rumor.  During his reign he received daily reports detailing the most 
prevalent rumors and political jokes.  His security services monitored and collected them 
while his intelligence services fabricated and spread them.  According to Maan Izzat, a 
former editor in the Ministry of Information, "Saddam was there because he knew what 
the Iraqi people were thinking."  Rumors were his way of keeping his finger on the pulse 
of the people, and knowing when to get tough. 9 
C. ORGANIZATION 
The thesis focuses on the case study of Iraq because the on-going insurgency is 
the most pressing illustration of the US’ need to win hearts and minds, and exposes the 
serious repercussions if we fail to do so.  Iraqis have long employed rumor as a credible 
                                                 
8 Baghdad Mosquito Early Edition, 28 Jun 2004. 
9 Michael Slackman, “Rumors Trigger Discontent in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 6 Jun 2003. 
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information source and reflection of the mood on the street, suggesting that naturally 
occurring, readily available rumors are an ideal guide in the battle for hearts and minds in 
this conflict.  The supply of data makes this case particularly attractive, with close to one 
thousand rumors reported by the Baghdad Mosquito from 3 October 2003 through 13 
August 2004, the timeframe examined in this study.  This thesis is both policy-relevant 
and of interest in social science more generally.  The next chapter reviews existing rumor 
theory, developed primarily in the West, and demonstrates how the majority of these 
concepts are also valid in the Middle East.  Chapter three applies this theory to actual 
rumors circulating in Baghdad, Iraq, in order to ascertain the underlying fears and 
concerns of the population.  Overarching themes and issues are identified, which should 
be addressed by Coalition information campaigns.  Chapter four examines rumor 
remedies, or how to prevent or control rumors, which rely primarily on effective 
communication skills.  This chapter looks at the differences between American and Arab 
cultural communication styles and uses that information to adapt Western rumor 
remedies for use in Iraq.  The last chapter summarizes the overall findings of this thesis 
and offers policy prescriptions for institutionalizing rumor processing to ensure public 
affairs, information operations and psychological operations efforts benefit from the 
insight rumors provide in the battle for Iraqi hearts and minds. 
9 
II. PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 
While rumors have been monitored and manipulated by states and individuals for 
thousands of years, the scientific study of rumor began in just the last century.  This 
chapter reviews current rumor theory in order to explain why rumors occur and how they 
develop and spread.  It also presents several options for analyzing rumors, and examines 
the type of information that can be learned from their study.  Although rumor research 
has focused predominantly on Western audiences, those studies that have been conducted 
in other societies indicate much of the foundational theory discussed in this chapter is 
applicable to other cultures, including those in the Middle East.  (Bauer and Gleicher 
1953; Nkpa 1977; Piff 1998; Prasad 1935, 1950; Shibutani 1966; Turner 1994)  The 
significant cultural differences that require some departure from this literature occur 
primarily when dealing with rumor remedies, and are addressed in chapter four. 
Gordon Allport and Leo Postman introduced the study of rumor into mainstream 
psychology in their seminal work, The Psychology of Rumor (1947).  (Bordia and 
DiFonzo n.d.)  They argued that rumors serve a complex purpose: they relieve emotional 
urges to ‘slap at what one hates,’ while rationalizing and justifying why one feels the way 
they do about a situation, ultimately serving as a catharsis to relieve the tension of 
uncertainty.  Based on their research and that of others before them, Allport and Postman 
created the Basic Law of Rumor10, in which they identified two conditions necessary for 
rumor to thrive: importance and ambiguity.  The law states that “the amount of rumor in 
circulation will vary with the importance of the subject to the individuals concerned times 
the ambiguity of the evidence pertaining to the topic at issue.”  (Allport and Postman 
1947b, 502)  The idea that humans have a desire to know their circumstances and that 
rumors offer explanation when information is lacking, remains at the heart of most 
current theories of rumor, although there have been considerable additions to this body of 
knowledge.  (Rosnow 2001) 
                                                 
10 The Basic Law of Rumor is a formula, depicted as (R ~ i x a), where ‘R’ is the amount of rumor in 
circulation, ‘i’ is the relative importance of the rumor subject, and ‘a’ is the ambiguity of evidence 
pertaining to the subject.  Note that the relationship between importance and ambiguity is multiplicative 
indicating that if either is zero there is no rumor. 
10 
Most significantly has been the recognition that an emotional component was 
missing from the basic law of rumor.  Interestingly, Jamuna Prasad proposed as early as 
1935 that rumors occur when uncommon and unfamiliar situations take place that cause 
emotional disturbances, such as anxiety and uncertainty, which influence how people 
respond to the situation.  Studying rumors circulating after a devastating earthquake in 
Northern India, Prasad said anxiety was a necessary condition for rumors to spread, 
noting that rumors subsided as people regained their emotional stability.  (Bordia and 
DiFonzo 2002)  Although Allport and Postman did not incorporate his findings in their 
basic law, later rumor researchers, most notably Ralph Rosnow, revisited this concept 
and ultimately devised four conditions that affect and possibly even predict rumor 
generation and transmission. 
A. CONDITIONS FOR RUMOR 
1. Uncertainty 
Rosnow uses the term uncertainty in place of Allport and Postman’s ambiguity, to 
define “a belief or intellectual state produced by doubt, such as when events are unstable, 
capricious, or problematical.”  Uncertainty exists when people do not understand, for 
whatever reason, what current events mean or what future events are likely to occur.  
This psychological state can result when the public believes information is being 
withheld, often due to censorship or lack of attention by authorities.  This can have such a 
significant impact that low levels of trust in information sources are thought to lead to 
increased rumor transmission even when other conditions are not present.  (DiFonzo, 
Bordia, and Winterkorn 2003)  Furthermore, when trust is high and there is no doubt or 
confusion, there is no rumor.  (Rosnow 2001)  Rumors typically flourish when 
uncertainty is widespread in a group or community, serving as a collective problem-
solving process to relieve intellectual pressure or tension by attributing meaning to the 
environment. 
The Middle East is often called the land of rumors and conspiracy theories, with 
stories ranging from the antics of a sports team to international plots to take over the 
world spreading like wildfire.  Perhaps the foremost cause is the endemic uncertainty 
resulting from the tight grip the region’s authoritarian regimes have historically 
maintained over the media.  Until the relatively recent advent of the Internet and 
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independent satellite television in the 1990s, individuals had little access to uncensored 
information.  People in the region have become so accustomed to hearing propaganda 
from state-sponsored news outlets that they are never quite sure what to believe, except 
they know not to believe what the government tells them.  (Farmaian 1992)  Thus, rumor 
has long served to explain current affairs and predict future events. 
2. Outcome-Relevant Involvement 
The second condition proposed by Rosnow is outcome-relevant involvement, a 
reconceptualization of Allport and Postman’s variable of importance.  Although a 
scientific definition of importance was never provided, it likely referred to the relevance 
of a situation and whether a person really cared about the outcome, based on Allport and 
Postman’s example, “An American citizen is not likely to spread rumors concerning the 
market price for camels in Afghanistan because the subject has no importance for him.”  
(Allport and Postman 1947b, 502)  Prasad also argued that in order for rumors to exist, 
they must be of collective interest or importance, suggesting that rumors are essentially a 
social phenomenon.  If a group had no interest in a topic or situation, there would be no 
rumors about it.  (Bordia and DiFonzo 2002)  Several studies have been conducted to 
determine the relationship between outcome-relevant involvement and rumormongering, 
or the spread of rumors, but so far there have been no definitive findings correlating the 
two.  Some results do seem to contradict Allport and Postman’s basic law, suggesting 
people are more likely to spread rumors when outcome-relevant involvement is low 
rather than high, possibly because they are less likely to examine those rumors critically.  
A complex relationship certainly exists, with many researchers seeming to agree for now 
that outcome-relevant involvement is a moderator variable—affecting the extent to which 
people contemplate what they do or say, but not necessarily in a set pattern.  (Rosnow 
2001) 
Based on this condition, it is not surprising that many rumors in the Middle East, 
particularly in urban areas, concern government or international conspiracies.  The people 
in the region have long witnessed the intrusiveness and control of regimes over their 
lives, as well as the frequent interference of neighboring countries in their affairs.  This 
has resulted in populations that have become sharply attuned to political developments 
that may ultimately affect their existence. 
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3. Anxiety 
Rosnow added the condition of anxiety to those necessary for rumor generation 
and transmission.  This is the emotional component many researchers felt was missing 
from the basic law of rumor.  Anxiety refers to “an effective state that is produced by, or 
associated with, apprehension about an impending, potentially disappointing outcome.”  
(Rosnow 2001)  While uncertainty often produces rumors to relieve the intellectual 
pressure people feel, anxiety leads to rumors as a way to express or relieve emotional 
tensions caused by anticipation.  Even though research has shown that rumors do not 
always erase anxieties and may even contribute to them, other studies indicate that the 
more stressful or fearful a situation, the more likely it is to produce rumors.  (Rosnow 
1991)  Finally, anxiety and uncertainty, while separate variables, are often linked 
together; as uncertainty increases, so does anxiety and vice versa.  This condition helps 
explains why wars, natural disasters, or an individual’s lack of control inherent in living 
under an authoritarian regime all witness dramatic increases in rumor generation. 
4. Credulity 
The final condition that affects rumor is credulity, or trust, which refers to 
whether the teller finds the rumor plausible or believable.  Generally speaking, people do 
not start or pass rumors they find untrustworthy because they have a vested interest in 
preserving their own credibility.  (Rosnow 2001)  Therefore, it is often thought that all 
rumors start with at least a kernel of truth; however, that kernel can become so misshapen 
that it becomes unrecognizable.  It should be noted that people are not as likely to 
scrutinize the plausibility of rumors when they are extremely anxious, which often results 
in more farfetched tales.  Repetition of rumors, as previously discussed in regards to the 
Iraqi ‘Circle of Information,’ can also foster credulity.   
While most Westerners who hear many of the rumors floating around the Middle 
East quickly dismiss them as preposterous, many Middle Easterners—even the very well 
educated—often accept them as fact.  (Pipes 1996)  One reason Middle Easterners may 
seem more susceptible to believing the stories and conspiracies rumors report is because 
they occasionally prove true.  One of the more notable examples is the Lavon Affair, in 
which Pinhas Lavon, the Israeli Defense Minister in 1954, plotted to stop the Anglo-
Egyptian agreement for withdrawal of troops from bases in the Suez Canal zone.  Lavon 
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believed that if British troops left, the Egyptian military could penetrate the Sinai 
Peninsula and potentially threaten Israel’s existence.  Working with the head of Israeli 
Intelligence, he arranged for an Israeli spy ring in Cairo to plant bombs at the American 
and British embassies and other buildings frequented by Westerners.  The attacks would 
be attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood and were intended to create doubt about 
President Nasser’s ability to protect foreigners, ultimately resulting in a British decision 
to keep troops in Egypt.  The plan was exposed, however, when members of the spy ring 
were caught and brought to trial.  (Smith 2001) 
Other examples of actual conspiracies include the Sykes-Picot agreement and 
Balfour Declaration during World War One.  In Sykes-Picot, the British and French 
governments drew up a secret treaty dividing most of the Middle East between them 
before the war was even over.  This violated British assurances given to Sharif Hussein 
for an independent Arab state if the Arabs revolted against the Ottoman Empire.  The 
Balfour Declaration, a British pledge to support a Jewish settlement in Palestine, also 
violated territory promises to Sharif Hussein.  (Cleveland 2000) 
The United States has participated in its fair share of conspiracies in the Middle 
East.  In 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent agents to Tehran to assist 
Iranian officers in organizing the coup against Prime Minister Mosaddiq, facilitating the 
return of the shah and his royal dictatorship.  (Cleveland 2000)  Just a few years later, in 
1956, the CIA was again involved in planning a coup—this time in Syria.  The revolt 
never took place due to friction among the participants, timing of the Suez invasion, and 
possibly early detection by Syrian intelligence.  Undeterred, the CIA financed another 
coup the next year but their plans were discovered, resulting in three members of the 
American embassy linked to the plot being expelled from the country.  (Smith 2001)  A 
more recent example of a US conspiracy is the Iran-Contra affair, which concerned two 
secret Reagan Administration policies in the mid-1980s.  The Iran operation involved 
efforts to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East through the 
sale of US weapons to Iran, despite an embargo on such sales.  Some of the money from 
these sales was diverted to secretly support contra military and paramilitary activities in 
Nicaragua, even though Congress prohibited this support.  (Walsh 1993)  This small 
sampling of actual conspiracies, and the rumors that undoubtedly accompanied them, 
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offer historical precedent as to why Middle Easterners are often more willing to believe 
rumors that appear farfetched to Westerners. 
B. CONTENT & CLASSIFICATION OF RUMORS 
While it is important to understand the conditions under which rumor occurs, it is 
the analysis of rumor content, or what specific rumors are about, that can provide insight 
into the attitudes, concerns, and anxieties of groups within a population.  Prasad 
emphasized social influences, such as group norms, interpersonal relationships, and 
shared belief systems or culture, when discussing rumor content.  He posited that rumors 
are typically exaggerations of the fears and concerns of the group sharing the experience; 
when people are faced with crisis situations they dig into their storehouse of cultural, 
religious, and mythical knowledge to try and find meaning, reduce uncertainty and 
relieve anxiety.  (Bordia and DiFonzo 2002) 
Within these bounds, rumors often address specific concerns, such as why 
electricity is so problematic in Baghdad or when schools in Iraq will reopen.  Many also 
include social or cultural stereotypes, usually making distinctions between in-groups 
(those the teller identifies with) and out-groups (those the teller is not a member of) with 
the identity of the victim and the perpetrator frequently changing roles depending on who 
is telling the rumor.  This practice can be explained by social identity theory, developed 
by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in 1979, which proposes that members of a group are 
motivated to see themselves as relatively better than other groups.  (Krauss and Chiu 
1998)  Rumors often help foster this positive self-image by attributing negative 
characteristics to out-groups, or blaming them for destructive events that affect the entire 
community.  As a result, rumors often intensify divisions between ethnic groups or 
religious communities.  For example, in October 2003, it was rumored in Iraq that the 
Sunnis believed US forces were planting improvised explosive devices in the streets at 
night so they could find them the next day and look good.  The Shi'a, on the other hand, 
believed it was the Sunnis who were planting the devices.  No group wanted to believe 
members of their own community could be responsible for the deadly devices that were 
killing more Iraqis than Americans.   
Sometimes, the specific message in a rumor is of little consequence, but the tone 
or type of rumor can still prove to be a valuable descriptive tool.  The content of rumors 
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was examined in depth by several researchers during World War II, including a very 
influential study by Robert Knapp that illustrated this concept.  (Knapp 1944)  Analyzing 
over a thousand rumors sent to Reader’s Digest from across the United States in 
September 1942, Knapp developed a three-fold classification system.  He found the 
majority of rumors could be classified as wish, fear, or hostility rumors.  Wish rumors are 
those that express hope or desire, such as rumors in Iraq in March 2004 that the US was 
going to provide generators for each neighborhood in Baghdad, or the rumor that many 
US soldiers were converting to Islam.  Fear rumors are derived from anxiety and panic 
and can include tales of atrocities or other dreadful events.  A common fear rumor in Iraq 
is that lists of Iraqis working for or cooperating with the Coalition are hanging in 
mosques or in the possession of resistance groups, suggesting those individuals will be 
targeted for attacks.  Another prevalent fear rumor is that criminals are dressing in Iraqi 
police uniforms and setting up checkpoints to rob and kill unsuspecting victims.  Not 
only does this rumor invoke fear, but it also encourages distrust of the Iraqi police at legal 
checkpoints, magnifying anxieties about the general security environment.  Finally, there 
are hostility, or wedge-driving rumors, whose essential motivation is aggression or 
hatred.  Many of these rumors are ultimately directed towards out-groups, or allies of the 
population through which the rumor is traveling, not the enemy.  Hostility rumors are 
often attempts to create scapegoats due to the inherent frustrations and deprivations of 
war—since the enemy is already publicly blamed for the war, there would be little 
emotional satisfaction in blaming them further.  Numerous hostility rumors have 
circulated in Iraq about the Kurds, for example.  They are being accused of taking down 
Iraqi flags in the North and putting up their own, fueling the belief that the Kurds want 
their own separate state.  Kurdish Peshmerga forces are rumored to have helped the US 
fight the Sunnis in Fallujah.  There have even been rumors that the Israeli Mossad is 
funding Kurdish supermarkets in Baghdad, implying a relationship exists between the 
Kurds and Zionists.  Overall, Knapp found a striking concentration on just a few themes.  
Half of all the WWII rumors were anti-Administration, anti-British, or anti-Jewish.  
Furthermore, over two thirds fell in the hostility category.  Knapp believed that his 
classification system and findings provided insight into important social problems like 
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low morale and negative public opinion, and could be used as a benchmark against which 
later rumor samples could be compared. 
While many researchers have adopted Knapp’s categories, particularly wish and 
fear rumors, there is no single or preferred classification system.  Rumor subjects are 
sometimes also used, such as in DiFonzo et al.’s study of organizational rumors, in which 
five types of rumors were identified: turnover, pecking order, job-security, costly-error, 
and consumer-concern rumors.  (DiFonzo, Bordia, and Rosnow 1994)  The population or 
circumstances surrounding rumors, and the information one hopes to gain from their 
study, often provides the best indication of what type of classification system to use.   
C. RUMOR TRANSMISSION 
Much research attention has been focused on how and why rumors spread.  
Allport and Gordon concluded that as rumor travels, it tends to grow more concise and 
easily told because what is seen or heard must be simplified in order to remember it.  
They based these findings on numerous classroom experiments in which college students 
passed on a communication using a serial transmission chain—similar to the childhood 
game of ‘telephone.’  Allport and Postman observed distortions and eliminations in the 
message as the students showed a tendency to eliminate (or level) and sharpen certain 
details in efforts to remember and pass on the overall meaning.  The result was the initial 
messages, which contained approximately twenty details, were reduced to about five.  
(Rosnow 1991)  Subsequent researchers recognized, however, that this is not the way 
rumors actually behave.  They often do the opposite, snowballing and becoming more 
elaborate the more they are told.   
H. Taylor Buckner proposed in 1965 that there are actually two different kinds of 
rumor patterns: a chain, in which rumors travel from person to person in a serial manner 
like that proposed by Allport and Postman, and a network, in which many people hear a 
rumor from more than one source.  (Buckner 1965)  Both types of patterns occur in every 
community, but groups are often predisposed towards one or the other based on their 
structure.  Buckner identified two basic types of groups.  Diffuse groups are usually 
rather large, are spread out geographically, and have limitations—either imposed or 
freely chosen—on interpersonal interactions.  An American nuclear family is often part 
of a diffuse group; its members are not likely to interact frequently with a large number 
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of mutually acquainted individuals or have many common interests.  Like Allport and 
Postman’s model, they are more likely to hear rumors only once over serial chains, 
resulting in a rapid decline in rumor content and accuracy.  Close groups, on the other 
hand, are those that have continuous contact among members, with little or no difficulty 
in any member seeing any other member.  Small towns, military units, or cliques are 
examples of close groups.  They do not have to be stable or long-term associations; a 
crowd or mob can become a close group during a natural disaster or riot.  Rumors 
typically circulate through close groups over multiple networks, with people hearing the 
information several times and from several sources, stemming any decline in rumor 
content.  Although diffuse groups certainly exist in Iraq, close groups better represent the 
large extended families, neighborhoods, and religious and ethnic groups Iraqis tend to 
associate with.  Furthermore, Iraq is a traditionally oral society, which means story telling 
is a valued and practiced art.  Transmitting rumors is a group experience, filled with 
emotion and intuitive insights, and rumors are likely to be repeated several times as 
additional members join the discussion.  While Buckner’s work demonstrated why 
rumors do not always experience leveling and sharpening, it still did not explain why 
rumors often grow in complexity. 
Some of the latest research in this area, conducted by Prashant Bordia and 
Nicholas DiFonzo, answered this question by demonstrating that rumor transmission is 
not just the passive retelling of a story.  (Bordia and DiFonzo 2004)  It is actually a rich 
conversation that involves the mutual exchange of ideas, opinions, and viewpoints, with 
people providing additional evidence to persuade others to believe or disbelieve rumors.  
They found that conversations about rumors typically follow a four-stage interaction 
process.  In the first stage, the rumor is tentatively introduced to the audience and 
reactions and questions are exchanged.  In the second stage, additional information or 
related personal experiences are shared in efforts to determine the veracity of the rumor.  
The third stage is dominated by sense making, during which the group evaluates the 
rumor and the associated information, often embellishing it in the process.  Finally, in the 
last stage the group loses interest in the rumor and the conversation turns to other issues.  
The  point  of  all  this  is  that   rumor  transmission  does  not  typically  occur  over  an  
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undifferentiated chain or consist of merely passing on information, but is an interactive, 
social process, filled with questions and repetition, that usually leads to rumor 
embellishment and personalization. 
1. Motivations for Transmitting Rumors 
Although rumor transmission is a social process, individual motivations can 
provide further insight into why rumors are spread and how people respond to them.  
Bordia and DiFonzo identified three psychological motivations underlying rumor 
transmission based on the goals of social interchange: fact-finding, relationship-building, 
and self-enhancement.  (Bordia and DiFonzo n.d.)  They found that all three motivations 
operate in any given situation, but one or two will often be more dominant.  To the extent 
that transmitting a rumor satisfies one or more of these motivations, it will likely spread. 
a. Fact-Finding 
The fact-finding motivation is closely aligned with the rumor theory 
already discussed.  The conditions of uncertainty and anxiety lead individuals to try and 
make sense of their environment, and rumors serve as a means to inform, educate or 
forewarn, often acting as collective warnings so people can take appropriate actions.  
While rumors motivated by fact-finding are at risk for not being critically evaluated if 
anxiety levels are too high, when anxiety levels are moderate these rumors are more 
likely to be accurate. 
b. Relationship-Building 
Individuals transmit rumors during social encounters, sometimes as a way 
to further their own relationship goals.  Information is the currency of power and 
influence, and rumors are often used as such.  They provide opportunities to grab 
attention, appear “in the know,” highlight status differences, and manipulate who is “in” 
or “out” by making references understandable to only some in the audience.  The type of 
relationship being fostered—a long-term affiliation or a brief encounter at a party—can 
influence whether or not a rumor is transmitted as well as its accuracy.  In short-term 
encounters, rumors may simply serve as a means to entertain or break the ice with 
accuracy not being that important.  When dealing with long-term relationships, however, 
the  rumor  teller  is  more  likely to only transmit rumors they believe, because they will  
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want to maintain their credibility.  They are also less likely to transmit negative rumors 
than positive ones, unless talking to close friends or the information provided can help 
avert a harmful situation.   
c. Self-Enhancement 
The last motivation identified by Bordia and DiFonzo is self-enhancement, 
and refers to individuals’ need to feel positive about themselves.  Going back to social 
identity theory, people derive their identity from the groups they belong to (in-groups), 
and want to see these groups as better than out-groups.  Individuals judge the accuracy of 
rumors based on their existing worldviews; positive rumors about in-groups and negative 
rumors about out-groups are not likely to be closely evaluated because they justify 
existing beliefs.  Rumors that contradict these worldviews, even if highly probably, are 
likely to be dismissed.  As a result, rumors motivated by self-enhancement are the least 
conducive to accuracy, yet can often have the most damaging effects such as instigating 
hostile reactions or inter-group conflict. 
 Overall, the rumor theory presented in this chapter suggests that rumor is a 
consequence of environment, events, and group structure, not culture.  Assertions that 
Arabs, or any other culture, are more prone to rumors should be carefully weighed 
against the presence of the conditions for rumor, and will undoubtedly fail to stack up.  
Some cultures, including many in the Middle East, may be more efficient at rumor 
transmission because their societies are generally organized around larger close groups, 
but efficiency does not equal proclivity.  There is no doubt, however, that rumors are 
prevalent in Iraq.  This is most likely due to their long history of authoritarian rule, the 
US-led occupation, and their uncertain future.  The next chapter examines the circulating 
rumors in Iraq, applying the foundational theory just reviewed, in an effort to determine 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
21 
III. IRAQ CASE STUDY 
This chapter applies the rumor theory presented in chapter two to actual rumors 
circulating in Baghdad, Iraq.  Rumors were analyzed and categorized in an effort to 
discern primary concerns and sentiments of the Iraqi people.  Several themes emerged 
suggesting areas the Coalition could focus public affairs, information operations and 
psychological operations efforts on to more effectively win Iraqi hearts and minds. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
1. Data Acquisition 
All rumors analyzed in this thesis were collected from the weekly feature, 
“What’s the Word on the Streets of Baghdad,” published in the Baghdad Mosquito by 
MNF I/III Corps ACE – OSINT.  A total of 966 rumors were collected, starting with the 
first publication of this feature on 3 October 2003, and running through the 13 August 
2004 edition.11  
Once a week Bill Putnam, chief of the Baghdad Mosquito, sat down with his Iraqi 
employees to discuss the latest circulating rumors and atmospherics in Baghdad.  The 
Iraqi staff is representative of the population in Baghdad, including Arab Sunnis and 
Shi’as, Kurds, and Turkmen.  Members of this group, consisting of both men and women, 
also come from different areas and classes of the city, reducing the likelihood of a single 
viewpoint dominating the rumors.  Most reported rumors are published, except “the 
outlandish or things that have no real effect.”12  According to Mr. Putnam, there is no 
reticence on behalf of the Iraqis to report negative rumors about the US nor other Iraqi 
groups represented in the meeting, allowing us to infer the reported rumors are accurate, 
uncensored portrayals of the existing word on the street.13 
2. Content Analysis 
Each rumor was categorized using two different typologies.14  The first typology 
identifies rumor motivation and contains Knapp’s categories of fear, wish, and hostility.  
                                                 
11 Data was cut off on 13 Aug 03 in order to complete this thesis.  The Baghdad Mosquito continues to 
publish its weekly rumor mill. 
12 Putnam, Bill.  E-mail to the author.  19 May 2004. 
13 Putnam, Bill.  E-mail to the author.  20 Aug 2004. 
14 See Table 1 and Table 3 for summaries of the typologies used. 
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(Knapp 1944)  Rumors were classified in the fear category if they reported or predicted 
atrocities, dreaded events, or fearsome behavior, such as a rumor that university students 
unhappy with their final exams were killing their professors.  Wish rumors expressed 
hope or forecasted desired outcomes and events, like a rumor predicting a new census 
would be conducted by the end of the year, suggesting elections could be held soon after.  
Rumors were placed in the hostility category if their primary motivation was aggression 
or hatred towards another group, or an attempt to create a scapegoat.  A common hostility 
rumor is that the US withholds electricity to punish the Iraqi people.  Some rumors had 
more than one motivation, such as conveying both fear of an event and hostility towards 
an out-group.  In these cases, the dominant motivation was selected.  For instance, the 
rumor that the US plans to turn over all its bases and the Green Zone to the Jews when it 
leaves could be classified in both the hostility and fear category, but because hostility is 
the dominant motivation, it was classified as a hostility rumor.  I also included a fourth 
category of curiosity rumors in this typology, to classify reports of obvious opinions and 
what Allport and Postman referred to as “pseudo-news”—information passed on with no 
value judgments or apparent sentiment.  (Allport and Postman 1947a)  For example, a 
rumor that people in the back of a white pickup truck conducted a mortar attack against 
the Green Zone appears to be motivated solely by fact-finding, not emotion, and was 
therefore classified in the curiosity category. 
The target of each rumor was also tracked (if one existed), with ten primary 
targets identified.  These include anti-US/Coalition, anti-Iraqi Administration, anti-
Saddam/Ba’athist, anti-Kurd, anti-Shi’a, anti-Sunni, anti-Iran, anti-Foreign Arab, anti-
Zionist, and anti-Terrorist/Insurgent.  Rumors were considered to be targeted if the 
antagonist of the rumor was identified, either explicitly or by making references that 
could be attributed to a specific group.  For instance, an explicitly anti-Iran rumor 
reported the Iranians had declared an unofficial war on the US and were using Iraq as 
their battlefield.  A less obvious, but still targeted anti-Sunni rumor suggested that the 
majority of kidnappings of foreigners occurred in Sunni areas.  All the targeted rumors 
fell in the hostility and fear categories with one exception—a report that Saddam has 
cancer and may die in a year's time.  This anti-Saddam rumor was classified in the wish 
category.   
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The second typology placed rumors into one of eight overarching subjects: 
Government/Political, Quality of Life, Insurgency, Security, Terrorism, Military, 
Communication, and Detainees.  These subjects were selected based on preliminary 
examinations of the rumors, as well as areas I expected to find a significant number of 
rumors pertaining to, such as detainee rumors in light of the Abu Ghuraib prisoner abuse 
scandal.  Several of these subjects overlap, like security, terrorism, and insurgency, with 
many rumors arguably able to fall in more than one category.  However, there are enough 
distinguishing characteristics within each subject to make separate categories worthwhile. 
The Government/Political category contains rumors concerning the transfer of 
authority to the interim Iraqi government, including internal power struggles, election 
schedules, constitutional provisions, and government institutions.  Rumors of corruption, 
patronization, and hidden loyalties in domestic politics, as well as international intrigues 
and plots regarding Iraq, are also included.  Finally, concerns about sectarian strife were 
incorporated in this category because most dealt with fears of federalism, the creation of 
autonomous or separate states, and the possibility of civil war. 
The Quality of Life category consists of rumors that convey or predict incidents 
that potentially affect Iraqis’ daily or future survival.  Rumors regarding reconstruction 
efforts (or lack thereof) and perceived US promises are included, as well as welfare 
issues such as the availability and safety of medicine, food, water, and utilities.  This 
category also contains rumors of Iraqi resources being “stolen,” such as oil, land, and 
even intellectuals (brain drain), and rumored restrictions on Iraqis’ ability to travel or flee 
the country if the situation becomes unbearable, such as the difficulty obtaining 
passports. 
The Insurgency category focuses on the Iraqi resistance, and threats of future 
attacks, demands, and calls for Jihad.  Groups or individuals rumored to be providing 
support and funding to resistance organizations, as well as Coalition or Iraqi government 




Security rumors refer to common crimes like murders, robberies, and 
kidnappings, as well as the ability of the Iraqi police to protect citizens.  Border security 
and threats against individual Iraqis that collaborate with or assist the Coalition are also 
incorporated in this category. 
The Terrorism category includes rumors about al-Qai’da, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, 
and other foreign fighters in Iraq not specifically linked to the resistance.  Car bombs, 
suicide attacks, and large-scale attacks against Iraqi civilians are typically attributed to 
terrorists and are categorized here.  Finally, this category contains rumors about the US’ 
role and responsibility for terrorism in Iraq. 
Military rumors primarily report US forces’ behavior, such as being rude, 
stealing, bad driving, and indiscriminately targeting civilians.  Also included are rumors 
about what role US forces would play after the transfer of authority, suggestions the US 
is lying about American casualty figures, and military employment of secret weapons. 
Communication rumors concern television and news coverage, CDs, flyers, signs, 
and other messages distributed in Baghdad, as well as attempts to sabotage these 
messages.  US efforts to communicate with Iraqis are incorporated here, with many 
rumors suggesting the US intentionally conceals or distorts information. 
The final category is Detainee rumors, which contains rumors about Abu Ghuraib 
prison, interrogator qualifications and methods, and interrogation assistance from 
countries like Israel and Kuwait.  Rumors about the type of Iraqis being held in prison, 
such as hardened criminals, Ba’athists, or even religious clerics, are included in this 
category. 
To assess the reliability of coding schemes for both the motivation and subject 
typologies, I enlisted a second person, armed with detailed guidelines, to categorize a 
random sample of 50 rumors and compared our results.  Coding consistency was 92% for 
the motivation typology, and 86% for the subject typology.  Disagreements were 
discussed and resolved. 
B. FINDINGS 
Findings based on each typology are presented along with significant themes and 
issues evident in this body of rumors.   
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1. Motivation Typology 
Some rumor theorists, including Allport and Postman (1947b), have rightly 
critiqued the hostility/fear/wish typology as being oversimplified.  They are correct that it 
is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to correlate a single emotion or motivation to any 
given rumor.  However, this analysis of Iraqi rumors demonstrates the typology has merit 
as an indicator of community morale and public opinion.  Table 1 shows the percent of 
hostility, fear, wish, and curiosity rumors, as well as the primary subjects of rumors in 
each of these categories.  Interestingly, almost 70% of rumors fall in the hostility and fear 
categories.  While there may be other factors contributing to this large number, the on-
going occupation and instability in Iraq likely play a significant role.  The prevalence of 
these negative rumors suggest many Iraqis are experiencing high levels of anxiety and 
uncertainty, fueling widespread fear and anger that is undoubtedly influencing their 
perceptions and opinions of the Coalition.  Additional insight into what those opinions 
are can be gained by looking at the rumor targets.  (See Table 2.) 
 
Table 1. Rumor Motivation Typology Results 
MOTIVATION DESCRIPTION RESULTS (966 Total) 
PRIMARY 
SUBJECT15 
Hostility − Wedge-driving, often directed 
towards out-groups 
− Aggression, hatred 
− Attempt to create scapegoats 
35.7% 
Gov/Pol – 31.0% 
Q. of Life – 16.5% 
Insurgency – 15.4%
Fear − Derived from anxiety and panic 
− Relays atrocities, dreadful or 
undesired events 
33.7% 
Security – 27.9% 
Gov/Pol – 24.8% 
Insurgency – 19.6%
Curiosity − “Pseudo-news,” opinions 
− No apparent motivation, target, 
sentiment 
21.5% 
Gov/Pol – 25.5% 
Q. of Life – 23.1% 
Insurgency – 16.8%
Wish − Expresses hope, desire 
− Wishful thinking, optimistic 9.0% 
Q. of Life – 25.3% 
Terrorism – 19.5% 
Gov/Pol – 18.4% 
Security – 16.1%
 
                                                 
15 The Primary Subject column displays the subjects most often referred to in each motivation 
category.  For example, 31.0% of all Hostility rumors concern Government/Political issues.  Subjects 
containing less than 15% of rumors were not listed. 
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Table 2. Targeted Rumor Results 
RUMOR 
TARGET 
RESULTS16 HOSTILITY FEAR WISH PRIMARY 
SUBJECT17 
Anti-US/ 
Coalition 208 / 21.5% 78.4% 21.6%  
Gov/Pol – 27.4% 
Military – 23.1% 
Q. of Life – 21.2%
Anti-Iraqi 
Admin. 54 / 5.6% 66.7% 33.3%  
Gov/Pol – 48.1% 
Security – 20.4% 
Q. of Life – 20.4%
Anti-Saddam/ 
Ba’athist 34 / 3.5% 67.6% 29.4% 2.9% 
Insurgency – 50.0% 
Gov/Pol – 32.4%
Anti-Kurd 
33 / 3.4% 97.0% 3.0%  
Gov/Pol – 72.7% 
Security – 18.2%
Anti-Iran 
29 / 3.0% 65.5% 34.5%  
Gov/Pol – 27.6% 
Insurgency – 24.1% 
Security – 17.4% 
Terrorism – 17.4%
Anti-Shi’a 
28 / 2.9% 82.1% 17.9%  
Insurgency – 42.9% 
Gov/Pol – 32.1% 
Security – 21.4%
Anti-Zionist 26 / 2.7% 88.5% 11.5%  Gov/Pol – 57.7%
Anti-Terrorist/ 
Insurgent 21 / 2.2% 81.0% 19.0%  
Terrorism – 57.1% 
Insurgency – 19.0%
Anti-Foreign 
Arab 20 / 2.1% 75.0% 25.0%  
Terrorism – 30.0% 
Gov/Pol – 25.0% 
Insurgency – 25.0%
Anti-Sunni 14 / 1.4% 71.4% 28.6%  Insurgency – 64.3%
 
 
                                                 
16 467 rumors (48.3%) were targeted towards the listed groups.  51.6% of reported rumors had no 
apparent target, or groups were only targeted a few times and did not warrant another category.  The first 
number in the results column refers to how many rumors were actually targeted against each group, while 
the percentage indicates the percent of total rumors reported (966). 
17 The Primary Subject column displays the subjects most often referred to in each targeted category.  
For example, 27.4% of all Anti-US/Coalition rumors concern Government/Political issues.  Subjects 
containing less than 15% of targeted rumors were not listed. 
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a. Hostility 
The hostility and fear rumors in Iraq are almost evenly divided, with 
hostility rumors having just a slight edge.  The fact that there are almost as many fear as 
hostility rumors is extremely telling when one considers the large number of sectarian 
divisions that exist.  Groups have been played against one another for decades under 
Saddam, who exploited religious, ethnic, and tribal divisions to protect and reinforce his 
own power.  By definition, hostility rumors drive wedges between groups, cast blame, 
and fuel anger and hatred.  With discriminatory practices the norm in Iraq one would 
expect a much greater number of hostility rumors, much as Knapp found in his study of 
wartime rumors in the US.18 19  (Knapp 1944)  Knapp’s hostility rumors were primarily 
targeted against the US administration and military, generally accusing both institutions 
of mismanaging the war or abusing power, although there were also a significant number 
of anti-British and anti-Semitic rumors.  Over 94% of the hostility rumors in this study 
were targeted against one of the ten groups listed in Table 2.20  Almost half the targeted 
rumors were anti-US/Coalition—over 20% of all reported rumors.  At first glance, this 
may not seem so bad considering the US is occupying Iraq.  However, when you 
compare the number of anti-US/Coalition rumors with those targeted against other 
groups, the numbers are more meaningful.  The second largest targeted group is the new 
Iraqi Administration, which was only targeted in 5.6% of rumors.  In this highly factious 
country, rumors targeted against specific ethnic and religious groups vary from 3.4% or 
less of the total rumors reported.  The fact that there are almost seven times as many anti-
US/Coalition rumors as there are anti-Kurd rumors, the most targeted ethnic group, 
indicates the extent to which the US is negatively perceived.  While these results are not 
surprising, they highlight the need to account for and address Iraqis’ negative perceptions 
of the US when crafting Coalition messages and evaluating Iraqi behavior. 
                                                 
18 Knapp’s 1944 study found 65.9% hostility, 25.4% fear, 2% wish, and 6.7% miscellaneous (or 
curiosity) rumors. 
19 In this study, 25% (82) of fear rumors identified an antagonist and were therefore included in the 
targeted rumors, but their primary motivation was fear, not hostility.  Knapp did not address this 
phenomenon in his study; it is impossible to determine if he experienced it, and if so, how he accounted for 
it.  However, even if all the Iraqi targeted rumors were included in the hostility category, hostility rumors 
would still not be as dominant as in Knapp’s findings. 
20 5.8% (25) of hostility rumors were either targeted against groups that did not warrant another 
category, or the target was not readily apparent. 
28 
The majority of anti-US/Coalition rumors deal with government/political 
issues, the military, and quality of life concerns, and generally imply that the US is 
encouraging instability and hardship in Iraq in order to fulfill its own selfish goals.  
Examples include rumors that the US wants a female to be the Minister of Defense to 
insult the Iraqi people, or that a taxi driver saw five dead Americans floating in the 
Euphrates River.  This rumor suggests the US is disposing of its bodies in the river to 
hide the number of casualties suffered.  There are also rumors that the US's efforts to 
improve Iraq are only designed to help President Bush get reelected, and all of the 
promises will be forgotten after the election. 
Anti-Iraqi Administration rumors focus primarily on government/political 
problems in Iraq, with many Iraqi officials and civil servants accused of being corrupt or 
self-serving, and failing to attend to security and qualify of life concerns.  For instance, 
the Taxation Office in Baghdad is rumored to be stealing people’s money by claiming a 
tax is needed for reconstruction, but the money just goes into the employees’ pockets.  
Anti-Saddam/Ba’athist rumors also deal with government/political issues, such as rumors 
that Saddam or members of his family are trying to return to power, but they primarily 
blame the Ba’athists for leading and funding much of the resistance. 
Iraqi Kurds, Shi’as and Sunnis were the primary ascriptive groups targeted 
in this set of rumors.  The majority of anti-Kurd rumors accused the Kurds of trying to 
dominate or break away from Iraq, with frequent rumors of preferential treatment from 
the US or collaboration with the Israelis fueling resentment and anger.  Anti-Shi’a and 
Sunni rumors dealt primarily with the insurgency, blaming members of each group for 
resistance attacks and destabilizing Iraq.  Although there are twice as many anti-Shi’a 
rumors as anti-Sunni, this may be attributed to two causes.  First, the notoriety of 
Muqtadah al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army have fueled many rumors targeted towards the 
Shi’a in general.  Second, many rumors about Sunni-led resistance movements referred to 
Saddam or the Ba’athists, and were therefore included in that category. 
Rumors were also targeted against external groups, such as Iran and the 
Zionists.  There has been deep-seated hostility between Iraq and Iran since the 1980s, 
when they waged the region’s longest, costliest, and deadliest war of modern times.  
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Rumors accused Iran of interfering in practically everything—government, insurgency, 
terrorism, etc—in order to perpetuate instability and ensure the “Iraq experiment” is not 
successful.  Israel is also rumored to be playing a large role in Iraq.  Labeled anti-Zionist 
in order to include anti-Jewish rumors not specifically tied to Israel, this category is 
probably more prevalent in Iraq than these numbers illustrate.  Israel is a hot-button issue 
throughout the Middle East, and hatred and suspicion is rampant due to the on-going 
Palestinian crisis and memories of the Arab-Israeli wars.  The majority of anti-Zionist 
rumors accuse the Israelis of trying to stealthily take over Iraq, similar to what is 
occurring in the Palestinian territory.  Rumors that Israelis are buying up properties and 
businesses, or that Iraqis will be issued passports similar to the Palestinians so when they 
travel Jewish settlers can come take over their houses, all seem to reinforce that some 
Iraqis are identifying their current situation with the plight of the Palestinians, and seeing 
themselves as victims. 
Finally, there were several rumors targeted against terrorists/insurgents 
and foreign Arabs.  Most of the rumors naturally blame these groups for the on-going 
violence, with many rumors accusing them of conducting attacks and participating in 
these movements for personal gain. 
b. Fear 
In addition to the low percentage of hostility rumors in Iraq compared to 
Knapp’s study, another interesting finding is the comparably high percentage of fear 
rumors.  (Knapp had a 2.5:1 ratio of hostility to fear rumors, while this study found a 1:1 
ratio.)  Although variations in coding criteria between the two studies may play a role, 
this difference in hostility-to-fear ratios is likely the result of Iraqis actually living in a 
war zone, and therefore more likely to experience high levels of anxiety and panic, which 
are manifest in fear rumors.  Most fear rumors in Iraq reflect the instability of the 
environment and predominantly address security concerns, government and political 
issues, and the insurgency.  For example, there are rumors that Arab men from the Gulf 
States are kidnapping women in Baghdad and selling them—$300 for a woman and $500 
for a virgin—with two girls already reportedly kidnapped.  There have also been rumors 
that Saddam is negotiating with the US to return to power, and there are regular rumors 
forecasting resistance attacks in specific areas of Baghdad.  In other words, most fear 
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rumors are concerned with events that may personally affect the lives of the Iraqis 
spreading them.  The citizens in Knapp’s study, on the other hand, were relatively safe in 
the United States during WWII and could afford to expend greater effort on “who is to 
blame,” or hostility rumors.  Fear rumors in his study were primarily concerned with 
military members or enemy actions, such as rumors of excessive casualties, spying 
activities, or sabotage.  These fear rumors focused on the outcome of the war and the 
welfare of American soldiers, but they did not convey the fear of personal danger present 
in many of the Iraqi rumors.  Although comparable large-community studies have not 
been conducted during times of peace, if one were performed I would expect the results 
to be closer to Knapp’s findings with a greater percentage of hostility rumors over fear 
rumors.   
c. Curiosity 
However, I would expect the percentage of curiosity rumors, which are 
quite disparate between the two studies, to be comparable to the results found in Iraq.  
Although Knapp only found 6.7% curiosity (or as he labeled them, miscellaneous) 
rumors, I concur with Allport and Postman’s assumption that they are probably more 
common than his findings portray.  (Allport and Postman 1947a)  Knapp’s low number of 
curiosity rumors is likely due to the manner in which they were collected.  In his study, 
individuals had to take the time to write rumors down and mail them in, decreasing the 
likelihood most people would expend that energy for a mere curiosity rumor.  In the 
Baghdad Mosquito forum, however, much less effort is required to repeat the rumors one 
hears, contributing to over 20% of all reported rumors falling in the curiosity category.  I 
suspect this is a more typical breakdown of rumor type.  Knapp did not indicate the topics 
of his miscellaneous rumors, but in Iraq, curiosity rumors were primarily about 
government/politics, quality of life issues, and the insurgency.  For instance, there was a 
rumored political fight between Alawi and Chalabi with both of their parties taking part 
in the battle; rumors that taxi prices have increased due to the gas shortage; and rumors 
that a very large cache of weapons was found in Fallujah.  Although these rumors do not 
provide a great deal of insight into Iraqi morale, they are extremely valuable when 




The last category is the wish rumor; I found over four times as many in 
Iraq as Knapp found in the US.  Although there is an inclination to view this is as a 
positive indicator, which it can be, caution should also be taken.  Wish rumors are 
believed to be more prevalent when “victory is in sight,” and people begin looking 
expectantly towards the future.  Knapp’s wish rumors, which included rumors of peace 
and triumphs over the enemy, were collected in 1942, long before we were close to 
winning the second world war, which could explain why only 2% of his rumors fell in the 
wish category.  All of the Iraqi rumors were collected after the conventional fighting was 
over and the US-led occupation was somewhat established.  Fear of what US forces 
would do once they reached Baghdad had likely subsided, allowing Iraqis to consider 
how their lives would change under a new regime, and contributing to the 9% of wish 
rumors in circulation.  Many wish rumors addressed quality of life concerns, like the 
government was going to give away 5,000 apartments to poor Iraqis, or the US Embassy 
was hiring 3,000 laborers.  Terrorism and security rumors were also prevalent, with 
reports the US had already captured Zarqawi, or that Prime Minister Alawi had 
personally shot five leaders of criminal gangs at one of Baghdad’s jails, suggesting the 
new Iraqi government was cracking down on crime.  Finally many of the wish rumors 
pertained to government/political issues, such as the rumor that Iraqis in traditionally pro-
Saddam areas are supporting the new interim government.  Overall, wish rumors seem to 
be a good indicator of positive morale.  There is a catch-22 to the wish rumor, however.  
While positive rumors reporting or predicting desired changes could certainly improve 
morale in the short term, they can also lead to increased expectations.  If those 
expectations are regularly disappointed, then increased hostility and frustration are likely 
to result.  Therefore, unrealistic wish rumors can be just as dangerous as hostility and fear 
rumors and should not be encouraged. 
2. Subject Typology 
The second typology breaks down the rumors by subject, and is depicted in Table 
3.  This typology successfully highlights specific Iraqi concerns, some of which were 
expected and others that are more surprising.  There are far more issues in this body of 
rumors than can adequately be presented in the space of this thesis, so I have highlighted 
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the most dominant or significant themes of each category to discuss.  Many of these 
concerns should be recognized and addressed by the Coalition, although this list should 
not be considered all-inclusive. 
a. Government/Political 
 The Government/Political category contained over a quarter of all the 
reported rumors, more than any other group, which is not surprising since building a new 
regime is such a significant process.  Three overriding themes emerged from these 
rumors, the first of which concerns the transfer of authority.  There was a great deal of 
uncertainty and fear about what would happen after the transfer, with many expecting a 
repeat of the looting and violence that occurred after Baghdad first fell.  There are also 
concerns about the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government since it was not elected.  
Many fear the new government will be as self-serving, corrupt and brutal as Saddam’s 
regime and will allow high-level Ba’ath party members to return to power.  This does not 
mean Iraqis did not want the transfer to take place, but they are obviously still anxious 
about how it will turn out. 
The second theme in this category concerns international plots to control, 
interfere in, or harm Iraq.  There are rumors of joint Zionist and US conspiracies to 
establish a Greater Israel, rumors of Iranian spies infiltrating both the resistance groups 
and the government to promote instability, and rumors that the US plans to wage wars 
against both Syria and Iran from Iraq.  There are also rumors claiming that many Iraqis in 
the new government are nothing but US puppets, with one rumor even suggesting that 
seven of the new ministers are US citizens and members of the Republican Party.  These 
rumors point to Iraqis deep distrust of their new government, their neighbors, and 
especially the US.  
The final theme in the government/political category concerns sectarian 
issues.  Numerous rumors claim the US wants and is encouraging sectarian strife and 
even a civil war as an excuse to stay in Iraq.  The perception on the street is that the US 
unabashedly favors the Kurds, who will not hesitate to establish a separate state if they do 
not get enough power.  With or without US encouragement, there appears to be 
significant fear that a civil war will occur.  Iraqis are worried that even if elections are 
held, groups that do not “win” will not adhere to the new government and its laws, and 
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stability will never be achieved.  Finally, there is a great deal of discussion that 
government employment is based increasingly on ascriptive identity or party 
membership.  If this fear (or fact, as some argue) increases, it could lead to groups 
attempting bigger and more violent grabs for power in order to claim a stake in the new 
Iraq before it is too late, which could very well fuel inter-group violence or civil war. 
b. Quality of Life 
The quality of life category refers to issues that affect Iraqis’ daily or 
future welfare.  Three themes stand out.  First, Iraqis are understandably concerned about 
their daily survival.  In addition to rumors and countless complaints about fuel shortages 
and inadequate utilities (electricity, water, sewage), there are also rumors about 
contaminated food, water and medicine; humanitarian aid being sold or destroyed so it 
does not reach the people who need it; and rising prices along with low or unpaid 
salaries.  Many Iraqis are also concerned their new currency is being forged; resulting in 
reluctance to accept it and possibly fear the money they have will become worthless.  
From all these complaints the idea that things were better under Saddam has emerged—
he fixed shortages faster and prices were better.  Unrealistic expectations most likely play 
a large part in this discontent, but that does not make these concerns any less real to the 
Iraqi people. 
The next theme is the fleecing of Iraq.  Many Iraqis are convinced the US 
is stealing their oil and gas, explaining the frequent shortages.  There is even a rumor that 
the Japanese discovered precious metals in their area of operations and are stealing it 
instead of helping with the reconstruction.  Jordan is refusing to return Iraqi bank 
deposits, US soldiers are buying up properties and businesses in Iraq, while foreigners are 
smuggling goods out of Iraq—even their palm trees and dates.  Rich Iraqis are leaving the 
country and scientists are being killed, causing a brain drain.  Overall, there appears to be 
a significant concern that at the end of the day there will be nothing left in Iraq for the 
Iraqis. 
There are two competing ideas in the final quality of life theme—the 
character of Iraq.  The first idea is that the US-led occupation is corrupting the country.  
Rumors of prostitution rings operating within the Green Zone, hotels becoming 
“whorehouses of parties with alcohol,” and even one rumor claiming US forces will turn 
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a local mosque into an amusement park all point to this fear.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, however, is the concern that Iraq is becoming too Islamisized.  Harassment of 
unveiled and western-dressed women is reportedly increasing, claims that Islamist parties 
have established “Islamic Police” and are intimidating university professors into 
relinquishing class time to them, and rumors that new Islamic laws will be soon be passed 
indicate fear of turning into a radical Islamic state.  Iraq has long been a secular state, 
albeit with Islamic trimmings, and now that Iraqis feel they have some choice in the 
matter, concern that extreme elements on either side will impose their standards on the 
rest of the country is expected. 
c. Insurgency 
Rumors about the insurgency are very prevalent in Iraq, coming in a close 
second to quality of life concerns.  Although I chose to list them as separate categories in 
order to highlight specific issues, there are commonalities between insurgency and the 
next two categories of security and terrorism, which if taken together notably equal over 
40% of the rumors in Iraq.  Many of the insurgency rumors are about resistance demands, 
threats, and calls for Jihad, but two interesting themes are also present.  First, many Iraqis 
do not believe the Coalition has been tough enough on the resistance, leading them to 
believe that the US is actually supporting the resistance, and even conducting some of the 
attacks, in order to justify its presence in Iraq.  They do not seem to understand that 
because the US does not know specifically who or where the resistance is, harsher 
military actions would affect innocent civilians as well.  They seem to believe the US, 
much like they thought of Saddam with his numerous intelligence organizations, is all 
knowing and they therefore just have to wait for the problem to be taken care.  It is 
crucial this perception be changed if the US is to make real headway in the 
counterinsurgency. 
The second theme concerns the make-up and motivation of the resistance.  
There is the natural tendency to assume resistance fighters are all foreigners or Ba’athists, 
and that all the support they receive comes from Saddam and his family, Iran, or some 
other external source.  There is tacit acknowledgement that Iraqis are also conducting 
attacks, but they are only doing it for the money.  These rumors suggest that if economic 
and employment opportunities in Iraq were better, average Iraqis would not participate in 
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the resistance.  This wishful attitude allows many Iraqis to shift all the blame for the 
insurgency—and their other problems—onto others. 
d. Security 
Almost tied in frequency with insurgency rumors are those concerning 
security, in which three dominant themes are present.  Most significantly are threats 
against collaborators.  Over 20% of security rumors, and almost 4% of all rumors, 
threaten attacks or death on Iraqis and their families if they work for or help the 
Coalition.  Lists of names of translators and other ‘collaborators’ are rumored to be 
posted in mosques or in the possession of terrorists and insurgents, and businesses and 
hotels are reportedly being told they will be attacked if they serve Westerners.  These 
rumors are creating widespread fear and undoubtedly limiting the number of Iraqis that 
dare to assist the Coalition or speak out against the groups and individuals causing unrest. 
The second security theme concerns common crime, such as murders, 
theft, and kidnappings.  Many of these rumored crimes are directed towards ‘innocents,’ 
including women, children, and even doctors.  These rumors serve to warn of the 
dangerous environment in Baghdad, but also invoke a great deal of fear.  For instance, 
rumors that doctors are being kidnapped for ransom have reportedly caused many doctors 
to go into hiding.  These fears, and the reactions to them, ultimately interfere in other 
aspects of Iraqis’ lives, such as the ability to get medical care if the doctors are all in 
hiding. 
This leads to the last security theme, the performance of the Iraqi security 
forces.  Opinions appear to vary, with some saying the Iraqi police are more polite and 
effective than Coalition forces, while others claim the police are corrupt, lazy, and even 
working with the criminals and terrorists.  Several rumors blame Iraqi security force 
shortcomings on the US, claiming the police are improperly used for political aims and 
against terrorism, and not allowed to focus on crime.  Others say the US has not armed 
the policed adequately, undermines their efforts to arrest criminals by immediately 
releasing them, and generally does not respect them.  Once again, rumors claim the US 





Two primary themes are evident in rumors about terrorism.  First, the 
terrorists are not Iraqis.  Similar to beliefs about resistance fighters, but much more 
adamant, are rumors that the terrorists come from other Middle Eastern countries, like 
Iran, Kuwait, and the Sudan, because suicide attacks are not characteristic of the Iraqi 
people.  Much as the US is prone to do, many Iraqis have also blamed all the terror 
attacks on a single person, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who they believe was “created” by the 
US to perpetuate terrorism and provide yet another excuse to stay in Iraq.  While there is 
no doubt that many terrorists are foreign to Iraq, this line of thinking serves to remove 
any fault for the current situation from the Iraqi people.   
Interestingly, the second theme somewhat contradicts rumors of US plots 
to keep terrorism alive and well.  While many of the terrorism-related rumors were about 
the fear of future attacks and the power these groups have over Iraqi lives, almost 20% of 
these reports were actually wish rumors that the US already had or was in the process of 
stopping the terrorists.  For example, numerous rumors claimed the US had already 
captured Zarqawi and other well-known figures, but was waiting to announce their arrests 
for political reasons.  There was also a rumor that the US was sending 400 specially 
trained FBI agents to Iraq to solve the terrorism problem.  These rumors indicate a 
positive desire for US help, but will likely lead to further hostility if the US cannot 
improve the situation. 
f. Military 
Most rumors about US forces concern their behavior, and are almost 
exclusively negative.  US forces are rumored to steal from Iraqis during house searches, 
indiscriminately target civilians, drive too aggressively, and to generally be rude.  When 
these rumors are compared to poll data taken from the April 2004 CNN/USA 
Today/Gallup Poll, however, 94% of respondents said they had never actually had any 
personal contact with US forces.  Granted, this poll covered all of Iraq, not just Baghdad, 
but this statistic goes to show how damaging rumors can be and how a few isolated 
incidents can influence perception. 
Another interesting theme is that US forces are using special weapons 
against the Iraqi people.  One rumor claimed a sleeping agent was used to knock Saddam 
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out, causing the sheep in a nearby field to sleep for a week; or that interrogators were 
using a special ray on Saddam to make him talk.  Other, more serious rumors claim US 
forces are deliberately infecting the population with AIDS, and that candy distributed by 
Coalition soldiers is poisoned.  These rumors perpetuate fear of the Coalition, with many 
undoubtedly started by enemy propagandists for precisely that purpose, but they should 
not be simply dismissed as they have the power to prevent Iraqis from talking to and 
cooperating with Coalition forces. 
g. Communication 
There were not that many rumors focused primarily on communication 
(less than 4%), however since the purpose of this thesis is to aid the battle for hearts and 
minds, which relies so heavily on communication, I included it.  One important theme 
emerged from this category, and is reinforced by many of the rumors in other 
categories—the Coalition does not appear to be getting its message out effectively.  Many 
Iraqis do not trust they are getting the whole story from the Coalition or the Arab news 
outlets.  Some rumors suggest the US is purposefully lying and withholding information, 
going so far as to kill journalists who are exposing its lies.  For example, US reports that 
terrorists have been captured are not believed because no pictures are released and there 
is no follow up on how they are punished.  The Arab media also receives some blame for 
not reporting all the attacks in Iraq.  Furthermore, while there is some recognition that the 
satellite news channels do not say anything positive about the Coalition, because Iraqis 
do not see the Coalition side of the story they assume what the Arab media reports is true.  
These rumors indicate that the US should not expect Iraqis to search out the Coalition 
message on new radio or TV channels, but should take the Coalition message to the 
sources Iraqis already watch and listen to.  Overall, the perceived unwillingness of the US 
to share information with the Iraqis is attributed to the US not valuing or respecting them.   
h. Detainees 
The final category concerns detainee rumors, the results of which I found 
surprising.  I expected there to be a significant number of hostility rumors pertaining to 
the Abu Ghuraib prisoner abuse scandal revealed in late April 2004, but only 1.7% of 
rumors mentioned Iraqi detainees or the prison.  Most rumors occurred in the first two 
weeks of May and then quickly died down; some of these rumors did not even condemn 
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the abuse, but condemned the US for releasing so many prisoners so quickly in the 
aftermath.  Many Iraqis were fearful that hardened criminals were being let loose.  I kept 
this category intact precisely because the numbers were so low.  There is no doubt that 
Iraqis are angry and concerned about the appalling abuses that were uncovered, and the 
US definitely did not win any hearts or minds over the incident, so why were there not 
more rumors pertaining to it?  While I can only speculate, two possibilities come to mind.  
First, although Iraqis are definitely upset about the incident, perhaps Americans are more 
enraged.  Most Americans believe in the high standards we advertise to the world and are 
duly shocked and embarrassed by these atrocities.  The fact that there have not been more 
rumors or apparent shock by Iraqis may be quite telling of their low opinion of US 
standards.  The abuse, after all, is not new, only the perpetrators.  The second possibility 
is more optimistic.  The US responded to the incident incredibly fast—charging and 
trying guards, replacing the prison leadership, reducing the number of prisoners, and even 
promising to build a modern new prison and demolish the traces of Abu Ghuraib.  
Perhaps this demonstration satisfied some of the Iraqi anger as they saw the US attempt 
to rectify the situation.  While one hopes the second possibility is more applicable, there 
is also the risk of Iraqis wondering why such speed and efficiency is not applied to their 












Table 3. Rumor Subject Typology Results 
 
 
CONCERNS RESULTS  (966 Total) 
Hostility/Fear/ 




F – 31.5% 
W –  6.2%
C – 20.6% 
− Transfer of authority concerns 
− International plots/interference in Iraq 
− Sectarian strife/possible civil war 
Quality of Life 
18.1% 
H – 33.1%
F – 26.9% 
W – 12.6%
C – 27.4%
− Struggle for daily survival 
− Fleecing of Iraq 




F – 39.0% 
W –  7.3%
C – 21.3%
− US not tough enough on resistance; 
supporting insurgents to perpetuate 
instability 




F – 56.5% 
W – 8.7%
C – 16.1%
− Threats against collaborators 
− Rampant crime 




F – 25.6% 
W – 18.9%
C – 10.0%
− All terrorists are foreigners 
− US perpetuating terrorism 




F – 18.6% 
W –  5.7%
C – 14.3%
− Bad behavior of US forces 





F –  5.9% 
W –  2.9%
C – 74.9%
− Coalition not effectively getting its 
message out 





F – 31.3% 
W –  6.3%
C – 12.5%
− Condemnation of Abu Ghuraib scandal 
− Fear of released prisoners/criminals 
40 
C. DISCUSSION 
The rumors reported in the Baghdad Mosquito provide a wealth of information, 
but there are some limitations to the data and its analysis that must be recognized.  First, 
the ascriptive identity of the person reporting the rumor is not disclosed, making it more 
difficult to determine the true motivation of each rumor.  For example, the wish rumor 
about Saddam having cancer and possibly dying within a year could have been classified 
as a fear rumor if the person transmitting the rumor was pro-Saddam and wanted him to 
return to power.  It is less likely a Kurd or Shi’a would feel this way, but it is possible 
that a Sunni might.  Therefore, in order to classify some rumors it was necessary to select 
the most probable underlying motivation, based on the tone of the individual rumor as 
well as the tone and motivations of other rumors reported during the same session.   
The second limitation is cultural—Americans classified the rumors.  Despite 
concerted efforts to categorize rumors from the Iraqi perspective, there were frequent 
occasions during the initial classification processes when American values or 
perspectives were unconsciously applied.  Further scrutiny and refinement of the coding 
process identified these errors and they were corrected.  However, as the next chapter 
illustrates, there are significant differences in how Americans and Arabs communicate, 
which could also result in misinterpretations. 
Overall, the two rumor typologies complemented each other extremely well, 
providing general indications of Iraqi opinions and morale as well as highlighting specific 
concerns of the Iraqi people.  Information operations and psychological operations units 
could use these findings to tailor campaigns that address many of these concerns.  This 
study also provides a general framework for public affairs representatives, alerting them 
to existing perceptions and enabling them to tailor messages and avoid perpetuating 
negative ideas.  Finally, this study could be used as a baseline for future studies to assess 
the effectiveness of the rumor remedies presented in the next chapter. 
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IV. CULTURE, COMMUNICATION & RUMOR REMEDIES  
In both the American and Arab cultures, communication is fundamental, 
yet each views communication fundamentally different. 
-  R.S. Zaharna   
One of the purposes of studying rumors is to find ways to prevent or curb them, 
averting the devastation rumors often cause.  The goal of this chapter is to present rumor 
remedies that can be applied in Iraq.  One of the principal elements in controlling rumors 
is effective communication, however, and it is well established that different cultures 
communicate in different ways.  In order to successfully refute and prevent rumors in 
Iraq, we must therefore understand how Iraqis communicate.  To do this, American and 
Arab cultural communication styles are compared to highlight disparities and sources of 
misunderstanding that are sabotaging our communication efforts.  This chapter then 
reviews existing rumor remedies, designed primarily for Western audiences, and adapts 
them for effective use in Iraq based on these cultural communication styles. 
A. CULTURE & COMMUNICATION 
When effective, communication has the power to foster understanding, trust and 
security, increasing the likelihood of cooperation.  Communication is the process of 
exchanging messages and creating meaning.  It is only effective to the extent that the 
audience receiving the message attaches meaning that is relatively similar to what was 
intended.  (Gudykunst n.d.)  In order to successfully communicate, therefore, one must 
not only consider the content and delivery of the message, but also how an audience is 
likely to interpret and respond to it.  Effective communication is a challenge within ones’ 
own community, but becomes exponentially harder when trying to communicate with 
people from different cultures, as is evident in the Middle East.  Despite multi-million 
dollar media campaigns, the creation of television and radio stations, and appearances by 
high ranking US officials on Arab television, anti-American sentiment continues to grow 
in the region.  (Snow 2003)  Some would suggest it is the language barrier that prevents 
effective communication.  Many praised the performance of former US Ambassador 
Christopher Ross, who addressed Arab television audiences in fluent Arabic soon after 
9/11.  According to some Arab communication experts, however, Ross spoke like a 
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hesitant diplomat, repeating his words and thoughts without any passion for what he was 
stating, suggesting Arab audiences were less impressed than those in Washington, DC.  
(Fakhreddine 2002)  On the other hand, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who speaks 
no Arabic and had to use a translator, was able to overcome the language barrier with a 
passionate delivery on the Arab television network al-Jazeera.  “Every facial, body, and 
hand gesture Blair made with each word he uttered seemed to communicate genuine 
belief in what he had to say.“  (Fakhreddine 2002)  Thus, effective communication is 
more than just translating words from one language to another.  Others would argue that 
Arabs’ negative perceptions of the US have nothing to do with communication; rather 
they are the result of divisive policies and actions such as the war in Iraq.  However, the 
primary purpose of public diplomacy and many psychological operations is to garner 
foreign support, especially during conflicts or for controversial policies.  (Zaharna n.d.; 
Stillwell 1996)  Our inability to do so reflects our failure to communicate effectively with 
the people in the Middle East.   
1. American vs. Arab Cultural Communication Styles 
Culture is a shared system of values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, and thoughts.  It 
is a consensus about the meaning of symbols—both verbal and nonverbal—held by 
members of a community.  (Barnett and Lee 2002)  This consensus is largely 
unconscious, with individuals following rules they are often not even aware of, such as 
how close to stand to one another.  While no two individuals follow these rules in 
precisely the same way, the concept of culture allows us to examine societies as 
collective entities, identify common patterns, and even predict behavior to some extent.   
Each culture has its own style and concept of communication.  Americans tend to 
have an information or transmission-centered view.  Communication is seen primarily as 
a means to transfer data, with problems often attributed to a lack of information.  As a 
result, they favor efficient, large-scale methods that get the word out to the most people—
a concept embodied by the mass media.  (Zaharna 2003)  Arabs tend to have a 
relationship or ritual-centered view of communication; its primary purpose is to connect 
people.  When communication problems occur, they are often referred to as relationship 
problems, with people turning to mediators to improve the situation.  As a result, the most 
effective and preferred way to communicate is interpersonally—or face-to-face.  While 
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recognized that this may not be the most efficient method, interpersonal communication 
is the most familiar and credible means for sharing information in Arab cultures.  
(Zaharna 2003)  The prevalence of rumors in Iraq demonstrates the power of 
interpersonal communication over the extensive media networks developed by the US.  
TV may get a message out, but personal discussions shape what that message is. 
Because American and Arab communication styles are so asymmetric, sincere 
efforts to connect may actually lead to increased misunderstandings and further magnify 
the existing cultural divide.  (U.S. Congress 2003)  Identifying and comparing where 
cultures fall along several recognized dimensions of communication, and adapting one’s 
style to accommodate variations is required.  It is also imperative to avoid ethnocentrism 
and understand that neither the American nor Arab (nor any other) style is correct or 
superior to the other—they are simply different.  The following are some of the most 
recognized aspects of communication and how American and Arab styles compare.  (See 
Table 4 for a summary.) 
a. Individualism vs. Collectivism 
One of the major dimensions used to explain cultural variations is 
individualism-collectivism.  Some scholars argue that the factor differentiating 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures is the role and importance each places on in-
groups.  (Gudykunst and Lee 2002)  The US is a very individualistic culture, with 
Americans typically belonging to many in-groups, such as their family, religion, 
profession, school, social clubs, etc.  These relationships often only influence behavior in 
certain settings related to that group, however, and tend to be short-term and utilitarian 
based—there must be some benefit to being a member or the individual will leave.  
Furthermore, personal goals are valued or take precedence over group goals.  People are 
expected to look after themselves and their immediate family, while social ties and 
obligations outside this nucleus are very loose or non-existent.  Personal rights and 
responsibilities are emphasized, privacy and self-expression are prized, and individual 
freedom is held dear.  When communicating, members of individualistic societies strive 
for clarity, and often perceive direct requests as the most effective strategy for 
accomplishing goals.  (Gudykunst and Lee 2002) 
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Arab cultures, on the other hand, tend to be collectivistic.  People are 
integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which protect and care for them throughout 
their lives in exchange for loyalty.  They typically only belong to a few in-groups—often 
family, religion and ethnicity—but these groups influence behavior across all situations 
and often to a much greater extent than most Americans are accustomed to.  
Relationships in these cultures are usually long term and based on implicit trust or some 
historical connection.  (Zaharna 2003)  Individuals will go so far as to sacrifice 
opportunities for personal gain in exchange for the needs of the larger group.  
Community, harmony, and tradition are emphasized in collectivistic cultures, along with 
the need to maintain face.  (Anderson et al. 2002)  To ensure social amity when 
communicating, they usually try to avoid hurting others’ feelings, imposing on them, or 
causing someone to lose face publicly, which means direct requests are often the least 
effective strategy for accomplishing a goal.   (Gudykunst and Lee 2002) 
b. Low-Context vs. High-Context 
Another significant difference in communication styles between most 
Americans and Arabs is context, or how much meaning is given to what is actually said 
versus the circumstances in which it is said.  Americans tend to be low-context, deriving 
meaning from conversations based predominantly on the words exchanged.  They tend to 
communicate in an explicit and direct fashion, voicing opinions and trying to persuade 
others to accept their viewpoints with irrefutable facts.  Americans place a great deal of 
emphasis on accuracy, evidence, rationality, and other features common to print or the 
written word.  Computers, math and legal systems embody low-context language because 
everything must be spelled out with nothing taken for granted.   
Arabs cultures, on the other hand, are typically high-context.  Much of the 
information conveyed can only be understood by looking at all of the circumstances 
surrounding a conversation—who said it, when, where, how, to whom, etc.  Facial 
expressions, posture, movements, speed and location of interaction all have meaning.  
Not surprisingly, people from high-context cultures are very good at noticing and 
understanding nonverbal cues.  When language barriers exist, they often place even more 
importance on nonverbal signals, which can lead to further misunderstandings when 
different cultural styles are involved.  (Zaharna 2004) 
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c. Direct vs. Indirect 
Related to context is whether a culture communicates in a direct or 
indirect manner.  In low-context cultures like the US, the speaker is responsible for 
getting their meaning across.  As a result, Americans tend to speak in a very direct 
manner, striving to remove expressive overtones and suggestive allusions from their 
communication in order to provide precise facts or expectations.  Clarity and emotional 
objectivity are prized and seen as signs of competence and candor, while losing one’s 
composure is equivalent to losing one’s objectivity.  To avoid appearing overly 
emotional, Americans tend towards understatement.  Meant to boost credibility, this 
characteristic often has the opposite affect on Arabs, who interpret speakers as not being 
completely truthful or fully presenting a situation.  Walter Cronkite is often considered 
the US model for effective communication, especially when it comes to the media or 
diplomacy.  His stoic figure, low authoritative and steady voice, and calm demeanor 
made him the “most trusted man in America.”  (Zaharna 2004)  Unfortunately, Arabs 
may perceive this style of communication as condescending, belaboring the obvious, or 
even excessively talkative when too many facts are offered up to prove a point.  
(Anderson et al. 2002)   
In high-context cultures like Iraq, the burden of meaning falls on the 
listener to interpret the message correctly due to their indirect style of communication.  
(Zaharna n.d.)  Because saving face is so important, communication skills are measured 
by how cleverly one can disguise criticism.  Arabs deliberately use affect and ambiguity 
to create subtle nuances in meaning.  They allude to shared experiences, sentiments or 
verbal associations to express and evoke responses.  Precision or facts are not as 
important as creating emotional resonance, thus a single anecdote, metaphor, or analogy 
may provide sufficient evidence or be persuasive enough to reach a conclusion, compared 
to the Western ideal of the more facts the better.  (Zaharna 1995)  For Arabs, emotions 
are often the most important part of the story and overstatement is commonly used as a 
tool to convey the appropriate feelings.  Emotional neutrality, especially in an 
emotionally charged context, can be perceived as a lack of credibility or even 
deception—if a person hides their emotions what else are they hiding?  (Zaharna 2004)  
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This indirect style of communication may result in the perception that Arabs are reticent, 
sneaky, deceitful, or mysterious.  (Anderson et al. 2002)   
d. Doing vs. Being 
It is also important to consider how each culture identifies themselves and 
what traits they hold in esteem.  Americans are the ultimate “doing” or activity oriented 
culture, as embodied in their “can do” attitude.  They emphasize and value measurable 
accomplishments and successes.  The concept of the “self-made man (or woman)” is 
celebrated because it suggests that anyone, regardless of his or her background, can 
achieve success if only they work hard enough and “do” enough.   
Arabs typically belong to “being” cultures based on their traditionally 
vertical social hierarchy.  Birth, family background, age, and rank are often more 
important than what someone does.  Even if they achieve financial or political success, 
some Arabs will spend enormous amounts of money to have their lineages traced in the 
hopes of uncovering connections to prominent tribes.  This also explains why the concept 
of honor is so central to Iraqis, and Arabs in general.  If a member does something 
dishonorable or is dishonored, it reflects upon the whole family or tribe, threatening all of 
their social standings unless corrective or retaliatory action is taken.   
e. Future-Oriented vs. Past-Oriented 
Arabs and Americans also view time differently, with Americans 
belonging to future-oriented and Arabs past-oriented cultures.  In the US, change and 
innovation are welcomed, the latest is often considered the greatest, and in the optimistic 
words of Scarlett O’Hara, “…tomorrow is another day.”  In other words, the future holds 
the promise of being better and brighter and is something to look forward to.  History is 
often considered irrelevant, and dwelling on the past is frowned upon and perceived as an 
inability to cope with the present.  Instead of focusing on the past, Americans spend a lot 
of time planning and forecasting the future, evident in how common it is to hear them 
say, “I will…”  (Zaharna n.d.) 
Arabs, and other past-oriented cultures, place much more significance on 
the historical continuity of human existence.  From their perspective, without 
comprehending the past, it is impossible to understand and attribute the correct meaning 
to events in the present.  As a result, much time and energy are devoted to historical 
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studies, and traditions and customs are cherished and preserved.  Furthermore, many 
Muslims believe the future is in the hands of God, not the prerogative of man, and it is 
therefore naïve and arrogant to discuss what “will” occur.  (Zaharna n.d.)  This is why 
many Muslims invoke the phrase “insha’Allah” or “God-willing” whenever future events 
or activities are discussed.  It does not indicate a lack of commitment; rather only God 
knows what the future holds. 
f. Monochronic vs. Polychronic 
Another difference in how Americans and Arabs conceive of time is 
reflected in how they use it.  Americans are a monochronic culture, viewing time as 
linear—often using time lines or similar devices to depict it.  Punctuality, schedules, and 
plans are valued because time is a real, limited commodity, during which task 
achievement is the primary goal.  For Americans, keeping time commitments and 
adhering to deadlines is indicative of one’s character, while Arab cultures often interpret 
this focus on time as rigid and myopic.  (Zaharna n.d.)  Because of this conception, 
monochronic cultures prefer to focus on methodically doing one thing at a time.  For 
example, Americans patiently form lines and wait their turn as sales clerks or bureaucrats 
help each person because they see this as the most efficient means to get things done.  
They consider it chaotic to try and do too many things at once. 
Polychronic cultures view time as cyclical, suggesting that time is fluid 
and abstract—what passes can reoccur later.  Schedules are created and used, but they are 
rather loose and flexible, with individuals seldom becoming upset if they are not 
followed.  Arabs have no problem doing many things at once, or multitasking, and do not 
see the necessity of matching specific activities with specific time frames.  (Zaharna n.d.)  
Unlike in monochronic cultures where task completion is the goal, polychronic cultures 
value relationships and conversation.  In Arab stores or offices, for example, attendants 
will handle several customers at once so as to please everyone at the same time.  No one 
has to wait.  They believe focusing on tasks instead of people is very insulting, while 
Americans may feel as if nothing is being accomplished or that they are not getting 




g. Linear vs. Nonlinear 
Finally, there are differences in how Arabs and Americans process 
information.  Americans tend to have linear thought patterns, stressing beginnings and 
endings.  They tend to arrange their thoughts logically, and often sequentially, in order to 
discern empirical evidence.  They prefer to think about one thing at a time, often claiming 
headaches or frustration when simultaneously bombarded by too many ideas.  Written 
text is representative of how linear cultures prefer to process information. 
Arabs belong to nonlinear cultures.  They tend to think in images, not just 
words, incorporating multiple themes in a seemingly random order.  Television best 
represents how nonlinear cultures process information.  (Zaharna n.d.)  Although these 
cultures may be perceived as illogical or disorganized by Americans, Arabs believe that 
dissecting and rigidly structuring ideas or events is equivalent to separating the parts from 
the whole, which would result in loss of meaning and emotional significance. 
 It should now be apparent that Americans and Arabs have distinct, often 
conflicting, styles of communication.  Although often overlooked or discounted, being 
cognizant of differing cultural styles and norms, and adjusting communication styles to 
bridge those differences, is necessary.  As the next section shows, one of the principle 
elements of rumor remedies is effective communication.  If these cultural communication 
differences are recognized and accounted for, I propose it is possible for the US to 
successfully adapt and apply rumor remedies in Iraq, alleviating many of the underlying 










Table 4. Cultural Styles of Communication (After: Zaharna n.d.) 
AMERICANS ARABS
Individualism Collectivism
- Individual goals/accomplishments valued 
- Networking among groups 
- Functional, utilitarian relationships maintained 
for one’s own benefit 
- Easy to begin functional relations, easy to sever 
nonfunctional relations 
- Relationships can be short-term 
- Fluid boundaries between in/out-group members 
- Value individual freedom and choice 
- Value equality in social relationships 
- Value horizontal communication among equals 
- Group goals/solidarity valued over indiv. goals 
- In-group loyalty/allegiance strongly valued 
- Relationships long-term, trust important 
- Relationship building of paramount importance 
- Distrustful of members of out-groups 
- Important to preserve “public face” of group 
- Dislike public confrontation, prefer private 
mediation 
- Value well-defined social structure, clear roles 
- Value hierarchy of superior/subordinate roles 
- Comfortable with vertical communication 
Low-Context High-Context 
- Meaning in message; explicit 
- Include details in message 
- Speaker responsible for message clarity 
- Meaning in context; implicit 
- Details in context, not message 
- Listener responsible for understanding message 
Direct Indirect 
- Direct, to the point 
- Clear 
- Objective (remain emotionally neutral) 
- Indirect, circular 
- Ambiguous, vague 
- Subjective  (deliberately use emotion) 
Doing Oriented Being Oriented 
- Emphasis on doing, action, achievement 
- Emphasis on measurable actions or product 
- Reward/recognition for doing and achievements 
- Strong tie between word and deed 
- Emphasis on social position 
- Self defined by who one is in relation to others 
- High regard or respect for social standing, 
regardless of achievements 
Future Oriented Past Oriented 
- Value on future (new, improved, advanced) 
- Ease in visualizing future activities/possibilities 
- View change and unknown as positive challenges 
- Takes risks despite unknown consequences 
- Frustrated or impatient with delays 
- Value on past (history, culture, tradition) 
- Easily see connection between past and present 
- Discomfort working with unknown/future events 
- Difficulty conceptualizing activities in future, 
such as planning or strategizing 
Monochronic Communication Polychronic Communication 
- View time as linear 
- Time can be divided into measurable units 
- Value punctuality, scheduling & planning 
- View time as nonlinear, can be seen as cyclical 
- Time not segmented, more fluid 
- Loose adherence to scheduling 
Linear Style Non-linear Style 
- One theme 
- Clear structural organization w/ beginning & end 
- Time segmented 
- May have multiple themes 
- Organizational structure fluid 




B. RUMOR REMEDIES 
In Iraq, combating rumors could alleviate many of the misperceptions and 
possibly even resentment that is currently flourishing, improving our chances at winning 
hearts and minds and effectively fighting the insurgency.  Rosnow proposed three general 
principles for rumor remedies, which I have categorized as proactive, reactive, and 
damage control.  (Rosnow 1991)  Each principle is presented, followed by suggested 
adaptations and applications for Iraq based on the cultural communication styles just 
discussed.  (See Table 5.) 
1. Proactive 
The first principle is to monitor and anticipate the conditions under which rumors 
thrive—uncertainty and anxiety—and defuse them before damaging rumors develop.  
This is done by ensuring lines of communication are open and accessible, and authorities 
are truthful in responding to concerns so as not to breed mistrust.  It is also important for 
authorities to provide as much information as possible without a community having to 
ask for it.  People must have faith and confidence in their leaders and media to provide 
complete, accurate information, otherwise they will always wonder what they are not 
being told and try to fill in the gaps themselves.  Finally, teaching people about the 
destructive nature of false rumors before they occur may also help stem their spread.  
This proactive approach to rumor remedies is the most likely to be effective, for once 
suspicions and prejudices take hold of a population, they become much more difficult to 
dispel.  Researchers and various business organizations have repeatedly demonstrated 
this principle works in the West (Kimmel 2004), but distrust and hostility of the US is 
already rampant in Iraq.  While it is too late to prevent current rumors, there is little doubt 
the US will be involved in Iraq for the foreseeable future.  We need to begin establishing 
a foundation of trust today in order to prevent damaging rumors in the future.  
Rosnow suggests authorities establish trust by building a record of honest, 
forthright communication.  Fortunately, most Americans have confidence in their leaders 
and the media to keep them accurately informed.  In Iraq and the rest of the Middle East, 
however, providing information alone is unlikely to produce trust.  How that information 
is transmitted, and by whom, may be just as important as the information itself.  
Concerted efforts to establish and build relationships are required before trust will 
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develop and information is likely to be fully considered.  There are numerous levels at 
which relationships can be built, and the US—including Americans of every rank and 
position—should actively pursue them all.  The most effective is the personal, one-on-
one relationship, which simply requires an investment of time and appreciation of 
communication styles and cultural norms.  While this approach may seem inefficient, 
extended Arab social networks should serve to multiply efforts as family and friends 
learn of the relationship.  Additionally, this is the most forgiving level to accommodate 
cultural differences.  If mistakes are made or misunderstandings occur, they can be 
apologized for or explained immediately.  At this level, sincerity and good intentions can 
go a long way.  Once established, personal relationships are likely to be stronger and 
more trusting than any other type.   
The next type of relationship is at the community level, which can be established 
by regular participation in community forums, town halls, or similar events.  A personal 
element is still present, but differences in communication styles must be accounted for 
more closely because groups tend to be less forgiving than individuals.  At this level, the 
opportunity exists to share and debate information, discuss community concerns, but 
most importantly to listen.  Americans tend to think there is a solution for everything and 
often try to help others by providing them, but they do not always wait to hear what the 
question or problem is.  Many times people just want to express their frustrations.  This 
does not mean ideas cannot be offered, but they should be presented as part of group 
problem solving efforts, with care taken not to overshadow or embarrass community 
members.  This also does not mean that one cannot disagree with members of the 
community.  Debate and discussions are passionate and prevalent throughout the Middle 
East, but cultural styles must be considered and adopted.  Americans tend to be 
competitive and strong-willed, but should remember that if the goal is to build 
relationships, it is not important to win every debate—it may even be counterproductive.   
The last type of relationship examined here is one established via the mass media.  
While this vehicle is the most difficult and least effective way to build relationships, 
television and radio are becoming increasingly prevalent in the Middle East and should 
be addressed.  If used effectively, the ability to reach and influence large populations 
exists.  In the 1950s, for example, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser became the 
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defacto leader of Arab Nationalism throughout much of the Middle East due in part to his 
regular and charismatic “Voice of the Arabs” radio broadcasts.  Today, state controlled 
media predominates in the Middle East and is generally recognized for what it is—a 
vehicle for promoting the ruling regimes.  Therefore, any state controlled media channels, 
including those funded by the US, are viewed with skepticism.  Independent media in the 
Middle East is a relatively recent phenomenon, with one of the most influential and 
widely known independent Arab news channels, al-Jazeera, established in just 1996.  
Although funded in part by the Qatari government, al-Jazeera has proven to operate with 
few government restrictions, and is therefore one of the more trusted news sources in the 
region.  Regardless of the source or channel, however, mass media in the Middle East is 
still seen as less credible than face-to-face communication.  (Rugh 2004)  The media is 
the least forgiving environment for communicating across cultures because it is a one-
way conversation—audiences cannot participate and clarify ambiguous verbal or 
nonverbal signals.  Despite these challenges, building relationships with audiences may 
be possible and would signal a willingness to engage the Arab world, but regular 
participation is required.  Appearances on talk shows or other forums where audiences 
can watch interpersonal interactions with a host or other guests and call in their own 
questions would facilitate relationship building much more so then broadcasting prepared 
speeches or statements. 
The primary requirement for all relationship-building efforts, regardless of the 
level, is time.  Sharing a cup of tea once a month, attending a community meeting every 
quarter, or appearing on TV once or twice will not suffice.  Relationships require 
dedication and energy and must be built before they are needed.  There are no quick 
fixes, but once relationships are established, trusted avenues will exist for addressing and 
alleviating uncertainties and anxieties before they become damaging rumors. 
2. Reactive 
If prevention fails and destructive rumors begin to circulate, Rosnow’s second 
principle is to pay attention to what they reveal about the sources of people’s anxieties 
and uncertainties, and work to alleviate the underlying causes.  It is important to note that 
severe anxieties (or emotional unease) must be diminished before uncertainties 
(intellectual doubts) can effectively be tackled.  (Rosnow 1988)  Reducing idleness, 
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monotony, or disorganization in a population can sometimes decrease anxiety.  (Knapp 
1944)  During wars or natural disasters, for example, by involving the local populace in 
community efforts or programs to improve their situations, they have less time to dwell 
on uncertain future events.  Additionally, they gain the satisfaction of “doing something” 
versus just waiting for the unknown.  (Allport 1943)  Once anxieties are at a less intense 
level, trusted sources providing complete, accurate information and refuting damaging 
rumors will help repair the situation. 
The US needs to respond to the destructive rumors currently circulating in Iraq.  
There is a common belief, however, that it is neither feasible nor advisable to refute 
rumors.  Many people believe that by publicly acknowledging a rumor, even if only to 
prove it false, the rumor will gain credibility or spawn additional tales.  However, the best 
evidence on rumor refutation shows that if a rumor has been heard, the least effective 
approach is to provide no comment.21  It is more effective to refute the rumor, and most 
effective to refute the rumor with a trusted source that does not have a vested interest in 
the subject.  It is also important to provide a context or reason for the refutation, 
especially for those that may not have heard the rumor yet.  (DiFonzo and Bordia 2000)  
For example, if a Coalition spokesman were to make the statement that candy handed out 
by US forces is safe to eat, it would most likely result in increased suspicion among 
Iraqis about that candy.  A more successful approach would be for the spokesman to state 
that contrary to rumors claiming the candy is poisoned, which were likely started by 
individuals trying to scare Iraqis, US forces only hand out candy as a gesture of 
friendship and it is safe to eat.  The most successful approach would be if a trusted Iraqi 
conveyed that message.  It is when no context is provided, or the source is not trusted, 
that refutations can be detrimental and perpetuate rumors.  Other guidelines for 
addressing rumors are to always and immediately confirm true rumors, or any part of a 
rumor that is true, and refute false rumors with consistent, memorable messages based on 
the truth.  (DiFonzo and Bordia 2000)  Lies, half-truths, or skirting issues will only feed 
distrust and lead to additional rumors.  This is not to suggest that rumors can ever be 
totally eliminated, or that every rumor should be refuted, but damaging rumors that 
negatively influence Iraqi perceptions and behaviors should be reined in. 
                                                 
21 DiFonzo, Nicholas.  E-mail to the author.  26 Aug 2004. 
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In Iraq, the first challenge is to find out what those rumors are.  As the Baghdad 
Mosquito has ably demonstrated, “sonar men,” or trusted individuals who report rumors 
as they occur, work well and should be instituted in other areas of the country.  (DiFonzo, 
Bordia, and Rosnow 1994)  Once rumors are collected, care must be taken when 
deciphering their content, with cultural communication styles taken into account.  As I 
suggested in the last chapter, this is not an easy task.  Among other characteristics, Arabs’ 
indirect style of communication and focus on emotional resonance may result in 
overstatements or allusions that can mask the underlying concerns of a rumor.  For 
example, in mid-July 2004, one of the Iraqi participants in a Baghdad Mosquito meeting 
said she hopes the Minister of Electricity dies.  When asked privately why she made this 
comment she said, “He has done nothing but lie to us.  He made so many promises, and 
yet we suffer.”  When US personnel mentioned how difficult it was to rebuild a power 
infrastructure with all the sabotage and attacks taking place she replied, “Then he should 
keep his mouth shut and not promise anything.”22  If one was not familiar with Arab 
communication styles, they might assume this woman personally despised the Minister of 
Electricity instead of recognizing she was underscoring her extreme frustration with the 
erratic electricity situation in Baghdad.  Even Americans with experience communicating 
with Arabs may have some difficulty recognizing the true tone and motivation of 
reported rumors.  Consultation with Iraqis when classifying rumors, especially those 
relaying the information and who know the context in which they were transmitted, is 
invaluable and would provide a more accurate picture.  Overall, rumor content must be 
considered in the appropriate context of the culture they emanate from.   
After officials collect and track circulating rumors, they need to determine which 
ones should be addressed; it is not feasible, and may even be counterproductive, to try 
and address every rumor.  It is impossible to establish hard and fast rules, but the general 
guideline should be to counter rumors that negatively impact the Coalition’s mission.  
This includes rumors that deter Iraqis from cooperating with the Coalition, those that 
prevent or impair relationship-building efforts, and those that may promote violence.  It 
should be remembered that if anxiety levels are too high, any efforts to refute rumors are 
unlikely to be effective.  Reducing anxieties by addressing the underlying concerns 
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conveyed in rumors, such as improving the availability of medicine, should be attempted 
whenever possible.  Regrettably, the US missed an opportunity to significantly diminish 
Iraqi anxieties immediately after the occupation began by not mobilizing communities 
and involving them more heavily in reconstruction efforts.  A year and half later, there 
are still rumors and comments that no Iraqis (or Arabs for that matter) have 
reconstruction contracts.  While employment opportunities have improved somewhat and 
local efforts, such as community clean-up projects, are recognized and appreciated, there 
is still a significant portion of the population—particularly young, frustrated men—with 
nothing to do.  The large, complex projects the Coalition has focused on are certainly 
important, and undoubtedly require outside expertise, but more local projects should be 
developed to involve the Iraqi people, even if they are low- or no-priority endeavors. 
Even when anxiety levels are reduced to a moderate level, refuting rumors solely 
with facts in Iraq is unlikely to be effective.  As previously discussed, relationships must 
be built and trust established for rumors to be successfully refuted.  When trusted 
relationships do not exist, or are not well developed, it may prove beneficial to channel 
information through mediators, such as Iraqi government officials or local sheiks and 
ulama (religious leaders).  Care should be taken, however, to ensure mediators are not 
viewed as mouthpieces or puppets of the Coalition, which would erode their trusted 
positions and diminish their effectiveness.   
Regardless of who is transmitting the message, remedies should be tailored to the 
motive behind the rumor.  Rumors motivated by fact-finding, as was evident in many of 
the curiosity rumors in Iraq, would most effectively be diminished by making the sought 
after information more accessible.  For example, providing regular, meaningful status 
updates on reconstruction efforts, including notifications of problems or delays, may 
decrease uncertainty about the electricity situation.  Promises, especially those that might 
be impossible to keep, should be avoided.  Instead, open a dialogue with the Iraqis and 
demonstrate awareness and empathy that these issues affect their daily lives—identifying 
with them on an emotional and personal level will likely go a long way.  Furthermore, 
these updates would highlight the negative impact the insurgents are having on individual 
Iraqis, especially if pictures of sabotaged and attacked infrastructure are provided and 
linked with specific shortages, and would perhaps encourage more Iraqis to speak out 
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against them.  Rumors motivated by self-enhancement, typical of hostility rumors, are 
more difficult to dispel.  While reducing uncertainty may help somewhat, working within 
trusted relationships is likely to be more effective.  For instance, rumors that the US is 
lying about the number of casualties it has received are unlikely to be successfully refuted 
by releasing a public statement denying the rumor and reiterating US statistics.  However, 
if US personnel were to discuss the issue with Iraqis they have established relationships 
with, mentioning how fortunate Coalition forces are to have good protective gear that 
helps to limit casualties, that rumor is more likely to diminish.  Once again, regardless of 
how well established relationships are, it is not feasible to combat every rumor in Iraq, so 
efforts should be directed towards rumors that are the most damaging or threatening. 
3. Damage Control 
In a situation like Iraq, it is inevitable that some destructive rumors will survive.  
Rosnow’s last principle is to take steps to minimize the damage rumors cause if attempts 
to combat them fail, such as taking legal action against sources or transmitters.  This last 
principle is mostly geared towards businesses or individuals, but even in those cases 
successful lawsuits cannot always undo the harm done to reputations.  It is improbable 
rumors in Iraq could be traced to their original source, or that the US could pursue legal 
actions against them even if they were.  However, when rumors become so widespread 
they are printed or broadcast in the media, corrections should immediately be submitted 
or interviews conducted, in a manner consistent with Arab communication styles, to 
refute the false claims.  When these actions are not taken, perhaps because they are not 
seen as important or significant enough, Iraqis have little recourse but to assume they 
have heard the whole story, adding credence to the rumor.  If certain papers or channels 
refuse to acknowledge these requests, question why they do not want the Iraqi people to 
know the truth via other Arab channels.  Just as the US media may distort or misrepresent 
issues, so will some Arab media outlets, but the Coalition needs to maintain a policy of 
active engagement.  In Iraq, the US may not be portrayed in the best light on every 
channel, but we cannot counter this negative image if we refuse to remain part of the 
conversation.  In the words of General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Ret.), 
It is not Al Gazeera’s or Al Arabia’s fault that we are badly portrayed in 
the Muslim world.  It is our fault, because our message has been 
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inconsistent, legalistic and Western in its orientation.  We can’t win the 
war of ideas if our ideas are not good.  (US Congress 2004) 
Even with rapid, culturally tailored responses to false rumors, there is no question 
that rumors may damage the valuable relationships the Coalition should be working 
diligently to build.  If this occurs, the best recourse is to find a mediator to help repair the 
situation.  At the personal level, this may be a friend or relative.  At the community level, 
a prominent or high-ranking member from a nearby community may suffice.  
Reestablishing trust and rebuilding relationships with a national or regional audience is 
much more difficult.  Continuing to engage viewers through regular media appearances 
may help, or it may be possible, with support from interviewers or hosts, to make an 
emotional appeal to the audience.  At all levels, demonstrate the relationship is important 
and worth the time and effort to salvage. 
Finally, it may be possible to counter some of the negative effects of damaging 
rumors in Iraq.  For instance, some of the most destructive rumors currently circulating in 
Baghdad are that individuals assisting the Coalition are being targeted.  It is impossible to 
refute this rumor because there is likely an element of truth to it and there is no way 
adequate protection could be provided for every Iraqi that worked for or provided 
information to the Coalition.  These rumors effectively force Iraqis to make the choice of 
remaining uninvolved or risking death.  So how does one persuade the Iraqi people to 
take the dangerous path?  The Coalition, or better yet the Iraqi government, could 
capitalize on this choice by promoting the heroism of the Iraqis that choose to cooperate.  
Subtly appeal to (but do not challenge) Iraqis patriotism, honor, and desire to build a 
freer, safer Iraq for their children.  It is doubtful many Iraqis would be willing to reveal 
their identities, but messages could be disseminated in their own words and voices, 
acknowledging the risks they are taking and the fear they have, but explaining the 
important reasons why they chose to do so.  This type of personal, nationalistic appeal to 
Iraqis, from Iraqis, to assist security efforts is likely to be much more effective than 
Coalition requests for assistance.  It is also important for the Coalition to make it as safe 
and easy as possible for Iraqis to cooperate.  Hotlines currently exist to report security 
information, but there is still fear of being identified.23  Strengthen and improve these 
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types of programs, and educate Iraqis on ways they can help while maintaining their 
anonymity.  If the Coalition is to beat the insurgency, active Iraqi cooperation is required, 
which means something must be done to counter the effects of these destructive rumors. 
There are few hard and fast rules for effectively communicating or dealing with 
rumors in Iraq—or anyplace else for that matter—but the two are tightly linked.  Rumors 
are unlikely to be successfully refuted without cross cultural communication skills, and it 
is difficult to effectively communicate with people filled with distrust and anxiety due to 
circulating rumors.  It is not an easy challenge, but it is one we must pursue if the US is to 
win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis and defeat the insurgency.  If we fail to address this 
source of hostility and fear now, it is likely to become more pervasive and destructive in 
the future. 
Table 5. Rumor Remedies 
 PROACTIVE REACTIVE DAMAGE CONTROL 




− Discover & alleviate 
underlying causes of 
rumors 





− Open lines of 
communication 
− Honesty 
− Provide complete, 
accurate info  
− Refute rumors with 
trusted source w/o 
vested interest 
− Do comment 
− Tailor remedy to 
rumor motive 
− Legal actions against 
sources and/or 
transmitters 
Tactics for Iraq − Build relationships 
to establish trust 





investment of time, 
effort 
− Identify most 
damaging rumors 
− Provide context for 
refutations 




− Challenge media 
sources to present 
other side of story 
− Enlist mediators to 
repair relationships 
− Counter negative 




− Adapt for high-
context, indirect 
style 
− Awareness of social 
norms, saving face 
− Facts alone unlikely 
to diminish rumors 
− Emotional, personal 
appeals may be more 
effective 
− Emphasize collective 
goals, responsibility 
− Do not disregard the 




Soon after US operations in Afghanistan began, and again after forces arrived in 
Iraq, calls for “better cultural intelligence” were heard throughout military, intelligence 
and policy circles.  Many of these calls came as a direct response to unexpected reactions 
of local populations and growing insurgencies in both of these countries.  In June 2002, 
Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said more 
cultural information would allow military commanders to better understand their 
adversaries in the far-flung corners of the world.24  Testifying before the House Armed 
Services Committee in October 2003, Major General Bob Scales, USA (Ret), highlighted 
the need for better cultural awareness of our military and civilian personnel in policy 
formulation, warfighting, and stability operations.  Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO) 
echoed those recommendations in a letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,25 
and he just recently called again for better cultural training and skills due to the on-going 
instability in Iraq.26  The Pentagon has tried to comply with these calls, teaching Iraq-
bound US troops the cultural basics, such as gestures and mannerisms to avoid because 
they might be interpreted by Iraqis as insulting.  But according to Randy Gangle, 
executive director of the Marine Corps' Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities 
(CETO), the basics do not equate to "cultural intelligence, understanding, and 
awareness."27  While there is yet to be an agreed upon, formalized definition of cultural 
intelligence, the intent is to supply commanders and troops with culturally specific 
information that will contribute to mission accomplishment.  In other words, it must be 
actionable.  This thesis has proposed a mechanism for supplying actionable cultural 
intelligence.  The analysis of rumors can identify specific concerns and fears of a 
population that explain behavior and affect local cooperation with US counterinsurgency 
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efforts.  If these concerns and fears are addressed, it could have a significant impact on 
security and stability.  Furthermore, rumors can be used to assess foreign public opinion 
and measure the effectiveness of a hearts and minds campaign.  While this thesis has 
focused on Iraq, the concept of incorporating rumors as an intelligence source is 
applicable to virtually any country as long as the content analysis and rumor remedies are 
tailored for the culture in which they occur.   
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis proposed the study of rumor as a way to guide and measure 
effectiveness of the battle for hearts and minds.  It reviewed existing rumor theory to 
identify how rumors function and what we can learn from them.  Rumors often serve as a 
window into the underlying fears, anxieties, and sentiments of a community.  By tapping 
into this abundant source of information, the US could develop a more successful 
campaign to assess, monitor, and gain the support necessary to defeat insurgents and win 
the peace.  This thesis employed two distinct typologies to analyze over ten months of 
circulating rumors in Baghdad, Iraq.  The motivation typology, adopted from past rumor 
studies, provided indications of Iraqi opinion and morale.  Findings suggested that 
anxiety and fear are prevalent and unremitting in Iraq, likely contributing to widespread 
hostility towards the US-led Coalition.  Indications of unrealistic expectations were also 
evident, potentially contributing to hostility levels as they go unrealized.  The subject 
typology identified overarching themes and concerns of the Iraqi people.  These findings 
suggested that there are specific fears and concerns inhibiting cooperation with US 
counterinsurgency efforts, most significantly rumored threats against collaborators and 
their families.  Areas the Coalition may not be effectively communicating with Iraqis 
were also identified, such as the US’ long-term intentions in the country and providing 
realistic expectations of reconstruction efforts; this type of ineffective communication has 
likely contributed to misperceptions and mistrust.  This thesis then examined rumor 
remedies, or how to prevent and control damaging rumors.  Because rumor remedies rely 
primarily on effective communication skills, American and Arab cultural communication 
styles were contrasted and integrated into tailored remedies for Iraq.  Ultimately, the 
findings in this thesis could assist Coalition information campaigns by alerting them to 
existing Iraqi perceptions so they can tailor messages to address significant concerns and 
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fears.  Finally, these findings could be used as a baseline for future studies to assess the 
effectiveness of rumor remedies and their influence on the battle for hearts and minds. 
B. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS 
The following recommendations could facilitate the practical analysis of rumors 
in Iraq, as well as the implementation of coordinated, effective rumor remedies. 
1. Institutionalize Rumor Processing 
Public affairs, information operations and psychological operations all require the 
insight rumors can provide in order to be truly effective in disseminating US intentions 
and shaping the Iraqi perspective.  However, there is no central, hierarchical mechanism 
to tie these efforts together and to ensure the information gleaned from rumors is acted 
upon by the appropriate units.  Even if rumor remedies are initiated, they could 
potentially backfire if coordination does not take place and conflicting responses are 
issued.  Therefore, a cell should be established with informed representatives from public 
affairs, information and psychological operations units, and the open source intelligence 
teams collecting the rumors.  Although there is often hesitancy for public affairs officials 
to be associated with ‘propaganda’ units for fear of compromising their positions as 
spokesmen, they play a critical role in shaping Iraqi perceptions and should be included.  
The cell leader must have some recognized authority in all these units to ensure real 
cooperation takes place.  If established, this cell would be able to determine which 
rumors should be addressed, ensure remedies are coordinated and complimentary, and 
share feedback on the effectiveness of different remedy techniques and strategies.   
2. Centralized Rumor Repository 
The MNF-I/III Corps ACE-OSINT team in Iraq has taken the first important step 
in collecting and disseminating rumors in the Baghdad Mosquito.  Rumors are currently 
examined on a weekly basis, as they are reported.  Analyses of rumors trends and 
underlying concerns are based solely on the institutional knowledge of the individuals 
assigned to the OSINT team, and when they rotate out of theater, that knowledge goes 
with them.  Aside from hundreds of archived issues of the publication there is no 
repository for this data that can help make sense of it all.  A centralized database of 
circulating rumors, that tracks when, where, and who reported it (ascriptive identity—not 
the specific individual), would help fill this gap.  The database should employ rumor 
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typologies to track rumors as they are reported.  Typologies could be similar to those 
used in this thesis; however, the specific needs of commanders and forces on the ground 
should also be considered in order to highlight specific types of information.  For 
example, a category could track rumors predicting attacks.  Subsequent analysis should 
show how reliable these rumors are—if at all—and possibly provide force protection 
indicators.  Whatever typologies are used, categories may have to be adjusted over time 
as new concerns emerge and old ones are resolved.  Once rumor data is in a centralized 
database, it could then be manipulated to more easily identify, analyze, and even 
graphically display predominant themes, trends and other findings.  Rumor remedies 
could also be tracked to monitor effectiveness and ensure message consistency.  This 
centralized database should be accessible throughout the operating area, and provide 
some capability—perhaps with a bulletin board or other portal function—for 
geographically separated units to share lessons learned about effective or ineffective 
rumor remedies, or receive guidance and suggestions for responding to new rumors. 
3. Increase Deployment Lengths 
Finally, while certainly not a popular suggestion, I propose deployments to Iraq 
should be extended to a year.  The reasons for this are likely applicable to many other 
positions, but I will only focus on those personnel that are or could be involved in rumor 
collection, processing, and remedies.  First, as I mentioned in the recommendation for a 
centralized repository, most of the knowledge about what rumors may mean or which 
ones are common and reoccur resides primarily with the personnel collecting them.  
Currently, rotation lengths vary in the OSINT cell, with some personnel assigned for a 
full year, while others deploy for only four months.  A database would help, but it still 
takes times to learn the nuances of the data and to comprehend the worldview of the 
Iraqis.  In four months, personnel are just starting to truly understand the Iraqi mindset as 
well as their jobs; when they leave there is an “experience vacuum” as a new person 
attempts to learn the ins and outs of Iraq and repeat the process.28  One-year deployments 
would provide more continuity and higher quality rumor analysis.  The second reason 
deployments should be increased is because one of the central elements of rumor 
remedies is trust, which in Iraq, is built on relationships.  Trusted relationships are 
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unlikely to be established in four months.  Short deployments may even frustrate Iraqis so 
they do not attempt to form relationships with Americans, since they know the person 
will be leaving soon.  When discussing the short assignments of government officials in 
Iraq before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General Hoar commented, “The 
lesson of Vietnam was that it was not practical to assign people to these kinds of duties 
for less than 18 months.”  (US Congress 2004)  I propose the same concept is true for 
personnel involved in rumor analysis in Iraq, although one year is likely sufficient. 
In conclusion, rumors are another tool that can provide insight into the 
perceptions, concerns, and fears of a community, and should be utilized.  They are free as 
well as prevalent in Iraq, unlike similar tools such as opinion polls that are costly and can 
only be conducted intermittently.  This is not to say that rumors should replace opinion 
polls or other tools, but they should be added to the arsenal.  Some familiarity and 
knowledge of the culture is needed to fully understand and alleviate the uncertainty and 
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